














The Thesis Committee for Jose Ignacio Guzman 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 
Mercados Campesinos: Food Sovereignty Construction and Peasant 




















Mercados Campesinos: Food Sovereignty Construction and Peasant 








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Global Policy Studies 
And 
Master of Arts 
 
 








I would like to offer special thanks to my adviser, Marcelo Paixão, for his 
invaluable input, guidance, and patience as I crafted my work. I would also like to thank 
my second reader, Rajeev Patel, for providing his expertise, thoughtful critiques and 
suggestions. I wish to acknowledge all the support from the staff and faculty of the Teresa 
Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies (LLILAS); I am particularly grateful for 
the academic and emotional support that Dr. Lorraine Leu and Perla Miranda provided in 
difficult times as I figured out the topic of my thesis. Additionally, I would like to thank 
Dr. Jason Cons and Dr. Daniel Fridman for their theoretical insights. I am also grateful for 
the support of my family, and of all the life long friends that I made during my graduate 
studies. Finally, I would like to thank all the people I met in Bogota, who shared the stories 







Mercados Campesinos: Food Sovereignty Construction and Peasant 
Autonomy in Bogota, Colombia 
 
Jose Ignacio Guzman, M.A; M.GPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor: Marcelo J. P. Paixão 
 
This thesis documents the history and most recent events relating to Mercados Campesinos 
(MC), a farmer’s market and short food distribution program that allowed peasants from 
Colombia’s central region to sell their products directly to consumers and bypass Bogota’s 
main food system. Broadly, the thesis explores the implications of food sovereignty 
movements aiming to provide alternatives for peasant autonomy, and state intervention in 
such movements. This thesis addresses the following questions: How do food, and under 
what circumstances do local food sovereignty movements arise? How do different actors 
participating in food sovereignty construction understand and articulate claims to influence 
and participate in domestic food systems in particular geographical settings? What 
practices of autonomy do peasants engage in to promote food sovereignty? The political 
efforts of peasant organizations, peasant farmers and international nonprofits introduce 
language and practices of food sovereignty and peasant economy within Bogota’s Master 
Plan For Food Security and Supply [Plan Maestro de Abastecimiento de Alimentos y 
Seguridad Alimentaria de Bogota, PMASAB], and the debate between these groups and 
 vii 
the state over the PMASAB represents a process of food sovereignty construction. In part, 
the thesis focuses on the political interaction different actors over norms, discourses, and 
claims of how to best manage the production and commercialization of food to satisfy the 
needs of Bogota’s population and rural peasants in the central region of the country. I argue 
that the arena of food distribution and commercialization demonstrates how political 
interaction between the state and other civil society actors, with different meanings and 
discourses over food security and sovereignty shapes policies and practices related to food 
systems. In the case of Bogota’s MC, peasant organizations, and peasant farmers attempted 
to create autonomy through discourses and practices over livelihoods, improved food 
production and commercialization, and urban-rural integration, as opposed to industrial 
and centralized production, distribution, and commercialization processes. The MC 
program, however did not result in full peasant autonomy, as it was managed within the 
confines of a food policy controlled by District and regional authorities. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis documents the history and most recent events relating to Mercados 
Campesinos (MC), a farmer’s market and short food distribution program that allowed 
peasants from Colombia’s central region to sell their products directly to consumers and 
bypass Bogota’s main food system. Broadly, the thesis explores the implications of food 
sovereignty movements aiming to provide alternatives for peasant autonomy, and the role 
of the state such movements, addressing the the following questions: How do food, and 
under what circumstances do local food sovereignty movements arise? How do different 
actors participating in food sovereignty construction understand and articulate claims to 
influence and participate in domestic food systems in particular geographical settings? 
What practices of autonomy do peasants engage in to promote food sovereignty?  
The political efforts of peasant organizations, peasant farmers and international 
nonprofits introduce language and practices of food sovereignty and peasant economy 
within Bogota’s Master Plan For Food Security and Supply [Plan Maestro de 
Abastecimiento de Alimentos y Seguridad Alimentaria de Bogota, PMASAB], and the 
debate between these groups and the state over the contours of the PMASAB represents a 
process of food sovereignty construction. In part, the thesis focuses on the political 
interaction different actors over norms, discourses, and claims of how to best manage the 
production and commercialization of food to satisfy the needs of Bogota’s population and 
rural peasants in the central region of the country. I argue that the arena of food distribution 
and commercialization demonstrates how political interaction between the state and other 
civil society actors, with different meanings and discourses over food security and 
sovereignty shape policies and practices related to food systems. In the case of Bogota’s 
MC, peasant organizations, and peasant farmers attempted to create autonomy through 
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discourses and practices over livelihoods, improved food production and 
commercialization, and urban-rural integration, as opposed to industrial and centralized 
production, distribution, and commercialization processes. The MC program, however did 
not result in full autonomy, as it was managed within the confines of a food policy 
controlled by the District. 
 
STATE OF THE ISSUE 
On November 9th 2004, over 200 peasants from 11 regional municipalities of the 
central region of Colombia came into Bogota’s main square, Plaza de Bolivar. They arrived 
with baskets, bags and wooden crates filled with produce and traditional food dishes, and 
set up their tents to take part in what was to be the first peasant farmer’s market in the 
Colombian Capital’s recent history.1  
The market was as much an economic as a political statement: peasants traveled 
into the city to demonstrate that they had the capacity to supply citizens without the need 
of intermediaries, wholesale distributors, or retail sellers. They also wanted to hand 
administrative District authorities a political proposal aiming to guarantee food security 
and food sovereignty to the central region of the country (El Tiempo, 2004a). Debates over 
District plans about the direction of Bogota’s food system allowed regional and national 
peasant organizations, alongside international NGOs to introduce language acknowledging 
                                                 
1 A commentator described the scene as follows: “After 50 years, this place became dressed again with 
food and fruits of the field, between women with their coin purses, looking for deals, curious people who 
came to ask for samples of fleijoa arequipe, arepa campesina and chicharron reventado. They are those 
sellers that hide wads of money in between their breasts and provincials of ruana, sombrero, alpargatas 
(common traditional peasant outfit), red cheeks and one or more gold teeth in their smiles . . . Some dressed 
as civilians but with their hands marked with work with the land and the hoe, and others, men of the fields, 
with their common outfits, those that when you ask them their name they will respond with a marked 
accent: My name is Arcenio Guamán and I’m here to serve you, Sumerced” (El Tiempo, 2004b). 
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peasant economy practices and the notion of food sovereignty in the PMASAB, and to 
institutionalize peasant economy practices in other District decrees (See Chapter Three).   
Concerns over the perceived inefficiencies of traditional wholesale distribution 
centers starting in 2003 prompted District officials to develop the PMASAB to modernize 
food supply, distribution, and commercialization chains in the region. In the case of 
Bogota, the wholesale market of Corporación de Abastos de Bogotá, CORABASTOS, and 
international supermarket chains control distribution food chains, while retail is divided 
through traditional stores (tiendas), market plazas, and supermarkets (See Chapter Two). 
Most of Bogota’s food is produced in the surrounding rural departments of Cundinamarca, 
Boyacá, Tolima y Meta, as well as the rural areas of Bogotá. In 2006, thirty three percent 
of basic food products consumed in Bogota were produced within a forty-kilometer radius 
and close to eighty percent within a radius of 300 kilometers. The PMASAB estimated that 
peasants supplied 65 percent of the city’s food (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). 
However, at the time peasant organizations argued that early drafts of the PMAASAB had 
no mention of the importance of peasant economies that produced and most of Bogota’s 
food. 
 
Mercados Campesinos became one of the main economic and political means 
where peasants demanded recognition in Bogota’s food system. MC began as a program 
led by peasant organizations, and collectively organized by peasants through Municipal 
Peasant Committees [Comites Campesinos Municipales, CCM] (See Chapter Three), 
aiming to reduce the unfavorable economic conditions of rural peasants. Through MC, 
yearly peasant farmers’ markets have taken place in Plaza Bolivar since 2004, and from 
2012 to 2016 smaller weekly markets have set up in different neighborhoods throughout 
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the city, benefiting over 3000 peasant producer-sellers from 80 municipalities in the 
central region of Colombia (Oxfam, 2015). Apart from weekly and the yearly market, 
MC expanded to include a wholesale distribution chain, “canal corto” (Short-Channel), 
in which small producers from different municipalities collectively aggregate food 
supplies in their respective CCMs to sell to market plazas and fruit-markets (Fruvers) 
throughout Bogota(Parrado & Gutiérrez, 2014). Beneficiaries of the MC have 
experienced an increase in net household incomes in between 15 and 20 percent through 
direct access to consumers (Oxfam, 2015) removing the chains of intermediary 
distributors and retail shops. Furthermore, women have benefited from MC as they make 
up about 70 percent of the participants directly selling products to consumers in the local 
biweekly markets(Parrado & Molina, 2014). 
Apart from the commercial aspects of MC, groups organizing the program aimed 
to influence food policies in favor peasant productive and commercial autonomy, and to 
guarantee food security and sovereignty to Bogota and rural regions in Colombia’s 
central region. Peasant organizations, mainly the regional peasant Association, La 
Asociación de Usuarios Campesinos, ADUC, and the national peasant union, La 
Federación Nacional Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria, FENSUAGRO, alongside 
international NGOs such as Oxfam and the Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad 
y un Desarrollo Alternativos ILSA (See Chapter Three), managed to influence the 
PMASAB by amending the plan to recognize the production and commercialization of 
peasant economies as an essential factor against hunger and malnutrition in the city and 
the region, and to outline food sovereignty as one of its defining characteristics.  
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With the early success the farmers’ markets, Bogota’s City Council signed 
Accord  455 of 2010, which institutionalized the program as form of local, regional and 
rural economic development based on the alignments established in the PMASAB. This 
Accord the aim of MC explicit: “the participants of these intermittent markers will be 
able to commercialize their agricultural products, organic and traditional crops, and at the 
same time present their artistic expressions and other cultural values of their 
region”(Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). The article recognizes a form of economy 
with distinct commercialization methods, variety of products, and unique cultural 
practices. The same accord, however, gave Bogota’s Secretariat of Economic 
Development, the agency in charge of the PMASAB, jurisdiction over the bi-weekly 
markets, as well as the larger MC that takes place in June at Bogota’s main plaza to 
celebrate the National Peasant Day. This section of the decree established the District’s 
regulatory control over the MC program, with consequences that to this day are playing 
out to the detriment of MC’s autonomous process, formerly led by Colombian peasants 
(See Chapter Five). 
MC continued from 2004 until the end of 2015, with partnerships between 
peasant associations and District authorities, beginning Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzón’s, 
and succeeding Mayors Samuel Moreno (2008 – 2011), and Gustavo Petro (2012 – 
2015), all members of the progressive party Alternative Democratic Pole [Polo 
Democrático Alternativo, PDA]. However, beginning in early 2016, with Enrique 
Peñalosa as the new Mayor, a change towards a more conservative political 
administration questioned the role of MC, and hence peasant economic and political 
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movements seeking out alternatives to the current food system. With the new 
administration, the district allowed partnerships with peasant organizations managing MC 
to expire, temporarily halting local farmers’ markets, as well as the yearly market in 
Plaza Bolivar (Cruz Roa, 2016). 
This thesis analyzes the conditions that allowed regional and national peasant 
organizations, alongside international NGOs, and other civil society actors to intervene in 
Bogota’s food policy. I am particularly interested in the attempts of Colombian regional 
and national peasant organizations to influence food policies informed by discourses of 
food sovereignty and autonomy. Furthermore, I am interested in analyzing the forms of 
economic, political, and social practices of peasants participating and benefiting from 
MC as forms of autonomy and reciprocity practices. Even though the District stopped 
providing necessary funds to MC peasant farmers’ markets, four of the fourteen biweekly 
markets continued in neighborhoods throughout Bogota. Peasants, with aid of local 
communal boards, continued to travel from neighboring regions into the city, pooling 
funds to transport their goods, set up the markets, and find transportation to return to their 
respective municipalities after their work days. As will be shown, peasant autonomous 
efforts to continue with minimal institutional support demonstrate perceived benefits of 
the MCs, and peasants’ sense of empowerment to continue selling directly to producers 
and work without mainstream intermediation channels. 
Nonetheless, as the case also demonstrates the District plays a fundamental role as 
a main actor facilitating and deciding the fate of MC, as well as broader food policies, 
creating tensions between aims of autonomy of peasants, peasant organizations, civil 
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society actors, and objectives of District authorities. The following research thus falls 
within and aims to contribute to the wide literature of peasant studies, specifically with 
regards to Food Sovereignty construction in Latin America. 
 
CLASSICAL CONCEPTIONS OF PEASANT ECONOMIES 
 
Chayanov, in The Theory of Peasant Economy (1986) described peasant family 
units as different to capitalist farmers, and hence challenged prevailing concepts of 
classical economics of the 19th century. Standard theories of wage labor and profit 
seeking were insufficient to describe Russian peasant families in the late 19h century. 
That is, the economic behaviors of peasant families did not fall under preconceived 
notions of production and profit seeking in farming practices. Instead, these families 
functioned based on “self-exploitation of family labor”, the subjective evaluation of 
whether the families achieved their basic needs. Each family sought an equilibrium 
between family needs and drudgery of labor. Therefore, what peasant families in 
Chayanov’s case sought, as opposed to profits, was to meet their subsistence needs. 
Similarly, Scott, in The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1977), shows peasant 
economic behavior as a main factor explaining why peasants in Southeast Asia revolted 
against exploitation from landlords and the State. Scott argues that failure is such a 
constant aspect of peasant lives that the economic choices they make are based on 
seeking safety, as opposed to seeking profit, as rational economic actor theories would 
suggest. For example, through the ‘safety first’ principle, Scott demonstrates that 
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peasants, when choosing seeds and cultivation techniques, preferred options that 
decreased risk and losses as much as possible, rather than maximizing their return on 
investments (1977, p. 18). Even in cases where peasants had the opportunity to use 
farming seed technology that guaranteed increased yields, they still preferred to maintain 
traditional farming techniques.  
The same applied to cases where peasants had to choose how to distribute their 
labor towards subsistence farming versus cultivation and sale of cash crops. Even though 
cash crops provided more profits, in terms of incomes, peasants only produced cash crops 
after their subsistence farming needs were met. The difference between the two types of 
crops lies in their respective risks; while subsistence farming guarantees peasants’ food 
supply, cash crops are riskier, as they depend on outside factors such as price, and 
consumer demand. 
However, the peasants in Scott’s account do not only embody the safety-first 
principle through their economic practices, they also express it through a range of 
“choices, institutions, and values in peasant societies that make up the peasant 
“subsistence ethic” (1977, p. 29). This subsistence ethic translates into a broader ‘moral 
economy’ guiding peasants’ relationships with surrounding institutions, as well as their 
notions of justice and rights. With regards to surrounding institutions, peasants’ criteria of 
fairness are based on whether whatever outside parties claim from peasant resources 
infringes on peasant subsistence thresholds, including (1), ownership over means of 
production and (2), subsistence guarantees and obligations from patrons and the state. 
That peasants have notions of what is just and what is right departs from analyses that 
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point to hunger, lack of incomes, or resources as sources of peasant revolt. Rather, there 
is a strong legitimizing notion as to how states and those that peasants are dependent on 
should rightly act. Thompson, similarly emphasizes  on the moral economy of the poor, 
stating that “men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were 
defending traditional rights or customs; and in general, that they were supported by the 
wider concerns of the community”(1993, p. 188). 
The analysis of grievances, and peasant revolts thus hinges on peasant, (or in 
Thompson’s case, the poor’s) conceptions of what is the legitimate use of power and 
obligation of states and landowners towards their subjects. Peasant notions of rights relate 
to the claims outsiders make upon peasants, in relation to exploitative versus non-
exploitative terms.  What landlords and the state infringed on, according to Scott, are two 
moral principles: norms of reciprocity, and rights to subsistence. Reciprocity, as Scott 
states, “means that a gift or service received creates, for the recipient, a reciprocal 
obligation to return a gift or service of at least some value at some future date.” (1977, p. 
163). The author sees this exchange of means or services mainly at the village level in 
Southeast Asian countries, in the form of mutual assistance practices, such as communal 
meals, labor exchanges, and ceremonial obligations.  
Along with reciprocity, peasants invoked the right to subsistence towards state 
and elites. Scott emphasizes that peasants operated under a logical assumption that all 
members in a community had at least minimal claims to survival as far as resources 
allowed, and that elite’s claims to peasant’s production and labor should have not 
infringed on their rights to subsistence. The state should provide the minimal level 
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conditions for their survival. However, this right ultimately depended on elite’s sense of 
obligation or perceived need of peasant’s labor and production. The conflict between 
peasants, elites and the state had to do most with shifts in previous traditional feudal-
subject relations, and the peasantry’s need to maintain previous relationships of 
reciprocity and maintenance of subsistence. As will be argued, modern peasant struggles 
continue to be based on interactions with the state, whereby peasant invoke guarantees 
and obligations that latter might respect, or completely disregard to the detriment of the 
former. 
 
CHANGES IN THE PEASANTRY 
Chayanov ‘s theory of the peasant family economy, and Scott’s further contribution 
of moral economy of peasants are important to understand peasant farmers and their 
economic and moral rationality. But historical changes have substantially modified the 
economic, social, and political context of present day peasantry, leading to different 
debates about the peasantry’s condition in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. 
Debates about the peasantry in the Global South is often placed within broader 
discussions of political and economic shifts in the international agricultural economy and 
state modernization (Friedman & McMichael, 1989; Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; 
McMichael, 2009; Van Der Ploeg, 2010). Rural populations, as well as agricultural labor 
forces have experienced a dramatic shift in depeasantization, meaning the transformation 
of peasants into capitalist farmers or laborers in urban centers. National development and 
land reform policies across the global south, although redistributing some land, have 
mostly benefited land concentration, with reform only applying to mechanized processes 
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of cultivation that favor land concentration. Reforms and state credits policies ensuring 
credit and marketing have benefited capital accumulation in the farming sector. Land 
reform policies in the 1950s throughout the Global South did contribute to a proliferation 
of small farm, family size, mostly remaining “petty commodity producers heavily 
dependent on state subsidies and public and private financing for their production, and 
increasingly, for their consumption needs” (Araghi, 1995, p. 347). However, policies in 
favor of mall farmers have been undermined as governments have decreased protection of 
local agriculture in favor of industrial development policies. States have accepted 
international commodity relations of the emerging world food order, which favors U.S. 
agribusiness subsidized exports. “Global Push factors” have led to processes of rural 
poverty and large transfer of rural populations to “urban centers of capital accumulation” 
(Araghi, 1995, p. 352). 
Depeasantization further accelerated in the Global South starting in the early 1970s. 
Araghi points to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System as a period that reorganized 
capital on a global scale. From then on financial capital has detached from national 
regulation, and this has been particularly deleterious to the peasantry. The export oriented 
policies that international financial institutions have supported as a condition to structural 
programs throughout the Global South has led to drastic cuts in farm subsidies, land market 
deregulation, wage freezes and the devaluation of national currencies, affecting peasants’ 
dependent on state support. Furthermore, the export oriented strategies have favored cash 
crops, with a result in the declining reliance of farmers on subsistence crops and increased 
dependence on international markets (Araghi, 1995).  
 
It is important to note that the interpretations above place world food systems 
within historical configurations of political and capital relations. This does not mean that 
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these relations are fixed. Rather these analyses allow us to conceptualize historical 
periods of crisis and transition whereby different actors contest power and capital 
relations. Debates surrounding current moment of crisis and transition point to tensions 
between emerging global agricultural complexes and local forms of agricultural 
production. As McMichael writes, “Just as the dynamics of the previous regimes centered 
on tensions between opposing geo-political principles – colonial/national relations in the 
first, national/transnational relations in the second, so the corporate food regime 
embodies a central contradiction between a ‘world agriculture’ (food from nowhere) and 
a place-based form of agro-ecology (food from somewhere)” (2009, p. 147). By focusing 
on forms of local agriculture, McMichael draws our attention to social movements of 
dispossessed small farmers, pastoralists and transnational counter mobilizations in the 




Food sovereignty first emerged as a demand of Via Campesina, an international 
peasant movement network made up of about 164 local and national peasant 
organizations in 73 countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas (Via 
Campesina, n.d.). Beginning in the 1990’s, Via Campesina started participating in 
debates and conferences relating to international agricultural trade and issues of food 
security. The movement was the first to criticize the Food and Agriculture Organization’s 
(FAO) concept of food security, which has evolved from a concept about state concerns 
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to provide sufficient food supplies and stable food prices, to a term that although it 
includes participation of non-state actors, reflected the weakness and lack of 
commitments of international organizations to quickly achieve human rights goals (Patel, 
2009). 
The food sovereignty movement of Via Campesina aims to consider food as 
human right, as opposed to a commodity; prioritize local and national production of food, 
as opposed to export agriculture, and promote trade policies that protect local farmers and 
guarantee just incomes, as opposed to trade policies that promote food dumping 
(Desmarais, 2007; Edelman, 2005). As declared by the Nyeleni Declaration of 2007, 
drafted by “organizations of peasants/family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, indigenous 
peoples, landless peoples, rural workers, migrants, pastoralists, forest communities, 
women, youth, consumers and environmental and urban movement”, food sovereignty “is 
the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through 
ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and 
agriculture systems.”(“DECLARATION OF NYÉLÉNI,” 2007)  
Via Campesina’s emphasis on rights stands out for the purposes thesis. Peasant 
rights politics informed by ideas of food sovereignty relate to a “right to have rights”. Via 
Campesina, by leaving language over rights vague, open spaces for “mass re-
politicization of food politics, through a call for people to figure out for themselves what 
they want the right to food to mean in their communities, bearing in mind the 
community’s needs, climate, geography, food preferences, social mix, and history. Part of 
what this thesis explores is the process of democratic deliberation, and peasant 
 14 
involvement in Colombian food politics, specifically in Bogota and the central region of 
the country. Colombia’s peasant organizations, representing thousands of small farmers, 
have influenced district food policies, engaging in discourses over rights demands 
centered in the recognition rural peasantries as integral to feeding Bogota’s population 
(See Chapter 3). 
For Edelman (2005) the rise of peasant transnational networks such as Via 
Campesina have not only resulted from the threats that international institutions posed to 
peasants worldwide, but also the globalization of moral economic norms. Food 
sovereignty aims to put decisions about food policies back into the purview of the state, 
in the form of state recognition of local food systems, and increased decision-making in 
the hands of food producers and consumers.  Comparing these demands with Scott’s 
moral economy, they relate to restoration of some forms traditional peasant norms of 
reciprocity, and balancing the unequal relationship between international institutions, 
powerful actors (agribusiness, and agricultural exporting countries), and small and 
medium landowning peasants. Furthermore, demands for livelihoods and autonomy, and 
just behavior of powerful actors bring us back to the concept of subsistence ethic, albeit 
within more complex discourses, invoking not only peasants’ right to subsist, but their 
right to continue livelihood practices.  
 
THE PEASANTY AND THE STATE IN FOOD SOVEREIGNTY 
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Bernstein (2014) criticizes the food sovereignty conception of peasant 
g‘community’ as an essentializing notion in food sovereignty discourses, which are 
attributed to the cooperative, reciprocal, egalitarian aspects of food sovereignty practices. 
For Berstein, this “strategic essentialism” of community discourses obscure tensions and 
contradictions for example, within gender or intragenerational differences within the 
community. Strategic essentialism also hides important questions about “who” makes up 
the peasantry. Furthermore, much of the food sovereignty literature amounts to 
“emblematic instances” of peasant practices, including agro-ecological production, small-
scale farming, seed exchange among peasants, and surplus sharing, which highlight the 
virtues of these practices as “capital’s other” (Bernstein, 2014, p. 1049). Bernstein claims 
that these ‘emblematic accounts’ bundle small-farmers, poor farmers, medium scale 
farmers, indigenous communities as part of one, the “peasant” social category, whose 
continuation is endangered by capital processes. In doing so, many FS researchers 
disregard why many farmers still choose, or depend on conventional farming methods. 
Another criticism Bernstein makes about the ‘emblematic instances’ of food 
sovereignty is that these hinge on specialized export and domestic commodity 
production. This is to say, the category of peasant as conceptualized by Chayanov, as 
those families living under subsistence rationality is an irrelevant one. Even within the 
Via Campesina movement, farmer’s organizations such as the Network of Farmers’ and 
Agricultural Producers’ Organisations of West Africa (ROPPA) in West Africa and the 
National Family Farm Coalition in the USA engage in commodity production and exports 
in international markets (Burnett & Murphy, 2014). Burnett and Murphy point out that 
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commodity production for international trade is an important matter for the livelihoods of 
millions of small-scale producers, underexplored by the food sovereignty literature. 
McMichael (2015) responds to Bernstein’s criticism of Food Sovereignty 
emphasis on ‘capital’s other’ by stating that as opposed to seeing peasant movements as 
otherworldly, the focus should be on seeing these as a fundamental product of capitalism. 
For McMichael, the peasantry is not a pre-capitalist class that needs to disappear for the 
expansion of capital. Rather, peasants are formed as historical subjects, which through 
the movement represent an anti-systemic struggle for their survival. The food sovereignty 
movement thus takes place within capital “against and (hopefully) beyond capital and its 
food regime, and so, as stated at the outset, the movement matures and evolves through 
struggle on a changing terrain” (McMichael, 2015, p. 198). Furthermore, the food 
sovereignty struggle is one of “unity in diversity” against dominant agriculture, making 
“peasantness” a political rather than an analytical category. The emphasis on peasantness 
thus shifts from questions about who exactly makes up the peasantry to those related to 
power relations, who wields power, and how peasants and other actors compete within 
and contest the current agricultural system. 
This Thesis, following McMichael, conceptualizes the peasants in the case of 
Mercados Campesinos as a political category, emphasizing the struggle of peasant 
organizations, and peasants from different municipalities of the central region of 
Colombia, alongside international NGOs to influence Bogota’s food system, while 
nonetheless being subjects intertwined and historically transformed within the same 
system. Furthermore, seeing the category of peasant as transformed within a historical 
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process, we can see how peasants attempt to reshape themselves while maintaining some 
characteristics of the past and aiming to retain a sense of autonomy in their economic 
practices. It is difficult to see the peasant as a category fixed in time.  
The differences between peasants and non-peasants represents a grey zone, a 
fluctuation of a process that shifts from de-peasantization to re-peasantization (Ploeg, 
2009). In some cases, peasants constitute themselves as capitalist entrepreneurs by self-
commoditization, or hiring of wage labor for their production. In other cases, non – 
peasants might shift to peasant subsistence and reciprocity practices. The peasant 
category as conceived by Ploeg also blurs the boundary between corporate (capitalist) 
farming and peasant farming, as well as different methods of food distribution. 
Depending on the cases, some peasants have constituted themselves as capitalist farmers, 
through land appropriation and reliance on wage labor, while other have come to own 
small farms and distanced themselves from main markets, relying instead on their own 
production and distribution mechanisms. Peasants thus reconstitute themselves through a 
reshuffling of balance of commodity and non-commodity relations. This reshuffling of 
the peasantry is based on the “particular features that reflect the society in which it is 
embedded and the history upon which it is built.” (2009, p. 39). 
Rethinking of changes in the peasantry, and of food sovereignty movements 
embedded in specific histories and geographies leads to questions regarding the 
continuing role of states as main actors interacting with peasant movements. Bernstein 
calls the question of the state the ‘elephant in the room’ of the Food Sovereignty 
literature. Peasant movement’s appeals towards the state would “encompass a range of 
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effective policies and practices, from regulating international (and domestic) trade in food 
commodities, to protecting and promoting small-scale farming, to ‘scaling up’ from the 
local to the national – and to subsidise both (small) farm incomes and consumer prices 
for food sourced from small farmers (above)? – in short, a list of demands that no modern 
state has satisfied” (Bernstein, 2014, p. 1054). Some Latin American countries, such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, have become significant actors in the Food Sovereignty 
movement, each with varying degrees of invention (Cockburn, 2014; McKay, Nehring, & 
Walsh-Dilley, 2014; Schiavoni, 2015). As Schiavoni (2015, 2016) states, national state 
intervention is a key challenge for research on food sovereignty construction; national 
level food sovereignty politics implicate the state, and thus forces a return to questions of 
state obligations, albeit in a different historical conjunction (2015, 2016). Furthermore, 
the call for food sovereignty movements to allow nations, peoples, and states to craft food 
policy, as opposed to policies ruled by the international arena, is also a call to reconfigure 
policies in a given territory and space, in which case the burden of who implements these 
rights falls back to the state (Patel 2009, p. 668). 
 
ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS 
 
At the center of the thesis is the aim of peasants to redefine food policies and 
practices that resist intensive industrial agriculture and centralized commercialization by 
wholesale markets and large supermarket chains. MC’s commercialization methods, 
including the canal corto, and the multiple farmer’s markets throughout Bogota can be 
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described by an emerging literature on the experiences of Alternative Food Networks 
(AFN). Mainly centered on cases in rich European countries and the United States 
(Jarosz, 2014; Renting, Marsden, & Banks, 2003) (Jarosz, 2014; Renting et al., 2003), 
AFN (also known as alternative food chains) refer to the emergence of new or alternative 
food supply chains as part of wider rural development patterns. These new chains take 
the form of diverse strategies, including organic farming, quality production of food, 
community-supported agriculture, and direct selling through farmers’ markets. Diverse 
interpretations of AFN exist, but researchers commonly define AFNs as those food 
networks with shorter spatial distance between food production and consumption; small 
scale and agro-ecological production, as opposed to large scale agriculture; the existence 
of food commercialization venues such as farming cooperatives, and their commitment to 
socially and economically sustainable dimensions of food production, distribution and 
consumption (Jarosz, 2008).  
These AFN represent efforts to re-spatialize and socialize food production, 
distribution and consumption, focusing on the development of links between producers 
and consumers, and rebalancing the unequal relations between urban and rural 
development (Blasi, Cicatiello, Pancino, & Franco, 2015). For the purposes of this thesis, 
it is important to inquire over how the separation of the city and countryside has 
fomented abstract dichotomies of the city and countryside, and how peasant organizations 
in Colombia have sought to bridge that gap by employing political discourses and 
practices in favor of rural-urban integration. The growth of metropolitan cities 
represented for thinkers and writers in the 19th century a separation from nature, a 
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triumph of humans over nature. This human triumph implies a control over the earth, a 
domination over the resources that nature provides. Cronon (1992) encourages readers to 
move away from the human-nature dichotomy to understand how intrinsically connected 
city inhabitants are to the “non-human” nature.  He warns, “[b]By forgetting those people 
and their history (those living outside of cities, in nature), we also wall ourselves off from 
the broader ecosystems which contain our urban homes (1992, 18). This abstract city-
countryside dichotomy has the effect of neglecting people outside in nature which 
continue to sustain the growth of major cities around the world.   
Discussions over human-nature, city-countryside and other dichotomies begs the 
following question: why the fictional separation between these different spaces? Cronon 
observes that commodity chains of wheat, lumber, and meat separated these commodities 
from their natural source and hid the processes of capital accumulation that stemmed 
from such commodification. Alienation from nature hides the environmental and labor 
costs that allow corporate and industrial agriculture to create profits and transform 
economic markets.  
Gouveia and Juska (2002) in examining the U.S. beef industry, provide an 
example in which corporate and state actions have manufactured the separation between 
production and consumption in contemporary agro-food industries. For the authors, the 
U.S. meat industry has been a site for capital accumulation, aided in large by cheap labor 
of immigrant workforces. Corporate control has been supported by state regulations 
which have continued reproducing the separation between producers and consumers. 
Regulations of the meat industry, rather than protecting workers, has focused on food 
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safety standards for continued consumption of meat. However, resistance towards food 
standards and better working conditions relate to a struggle towards achieving unity, 
bridging the gap between producers and consumers, and hence it can be argued, a process 
that recognizes the value of workers as an essential component to food production. This 
resistance stems from tensions between unity and separation embedded in social and class 
relations characterizing different historical eras. The historical era of capitalism that we 
are living can be seen as one of dissembedding relations between humans and nature to 
draw from labor and natural resources as cheaply as possible (Moore, 2003). 
AFN and the MC program in Bogota aim to re-embed the peasantry, and hence 
city and countryside relations into Bogota’s food system, by checking, challenging, and 
influencing it in favor of more regional urban-rural development and reciprocity practices 
(See Chapter Four). Alternative food systems reframing food policy in terms of food 
sovereignty also seek to propose a solidarity based production rationality, based on 
dignified and livable and fair wages, quality production, and local food production 
(Heller, 2011). The AFN attempts to link production, distribution and consumption with 
the aim of promoting solidarity amongst peasant populations and consumers. There is an 
emphasis on sustainable development, which seeks to benefit often excluded and 
impoverished producers by improving incomes, maintaining cultural food practices, and 
ensuring democratic participation of peasant farmers.  
The conceptions and experiences of AFNs could also fall to Bernstein’s criticisms 
of essentializing community. As will be shown, the MC program is more an attempt of 
associations and civil society groups with different goals to attain “unity in diversity”. 
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Furthermore, questions about the role of the state in these AFNs arise. The multiplicity of 
actors in food sovereignty movements, and what happens to these alternative food 




This thesis contributes to the literature of food sovereignty construction, which 
involves actors with different meanings and goals interacting to influence the direction of 
food systems in particular geographical areas. The work is as much a historical account 
of how and under what conditions sovereignty movements arise, as how the definition of 
and how food sovereignty is continually manifested according to competing meanings. 
Furthermore, the thesis focuses in part on the prevalence of the state as a main factor 
influencing and dictating efforts towards, and at times against food sovereignty and 
peasant autonomy. The thesis centers on a regional and local level (involving the District 
and surrounding department), rather than national level food policies, but it nonetheless 
touches on current debates of state involvement. Finally, it also highlights the challenges 
and opportunities of food sovereignty at regional levels and what this means to the 
advancement and resistance of autonomous, egalitarian, and democratically based 
alternative food systems. To achieve this analysis, the thesis draws on Schiavoni’s (2016) 
historical-relational-interactive (h-r-i) framework to study processes of food sovereignty 
construction: how different actors, including peasant organizations, peasants participating 
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in Mercados Campesinos, civil society groups, and District authorities, articulate, 
implement, and contest food policies and practices in a given setting.  
The (h-r-i) framework emphasizes food sovereignty construction first as a 
historical process, shaped by the history in which it arises, and that continues to change 
as it unfolds over time. Second, a relational approach to food sovereignty emphasizes the 
open-ended nature of food sovereignty construction, the different meanings and goals of 
food sovereignty that actors pursue. Third, an interactive approach helps see food 
sovereignty construction as not exclusively driven by the state or other actors, but coming 
from the interaction between these different actors. The unit of analysis in the third 
component of the h-r-i framework is the political interaction between the main actors 
influencing food sovereignty construction. As Schiavoni argues, “the actions of state 
actors with respect to food sovereignty can only be understood in dialectical relationship 




The analysis of the Mercados Campesinos program, based on secondary sources, 
newspaper archives, participant observation and interviews uses a critical case study 
method (Yin, 2014). I conducted semi-formal interviews with key members of the 
peasant organizations ADUC, and FENSUAGRO, and AGROCOMUNAL, the main 
organizations that helped coordinate and manage MC and the CCM, to understand how 
they rationalize the existence and continuation of MC and their roles in the project. The 
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interviews were also designed to understand how the peasant organizations understand 
and articulate the MC project through the lens of food sovereignty. The interview 
included the organization’s perspectives on MC, their role in the political demands for 
peasant recognition in the district’s food policies, and their relationship with other partner 
peasant organizations, international NGOs, and the District. To complement the 
information that organization members provided, I conducted interviews with Oxfam 
members and local activists to understand their role with farmer associations and the MC 
program. Although the data gathered from the interviews do not provide a statistically 
representative sample of actors participating in the program, they provide an impression 
of the current discourse and rationales that actors at the policy level employ in favor of 
MC within the overall food system of Bogota.  
I was not able to interview many representatives from the District due to limited 
access and fieldwork research time. I engaged in informal interviews and conversations 
with staff from Bogota’s Institute for Social Economy [Instituto para la Economia 
Social, IPES], a District agency in charge of 16 public market plazas throughout the city, 
which MC’s short distribution channel supplied, and where some peasants sell during 
weekends. IPES, although not as influential as the Economic Development Secretariat, is 
involved in the planning of future MCs according to the new development plan of Mayor 
Peñalosa’s administration (See Chapter Four). To further understand how the District 
conceives of MC within a wider food system, I drew information from newspaper articles 
related to MC, and interview articles with the former Secretary of Economic 
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Development of the city, as well as District decrees and legislations pertinent to Bogota’s 
food system.  
The interviews I conducted lasted from fifteen to forty-five minutes, depending on 
how available the informants were. The interviews varied from official to more informal 
tones. For example, meetings with organization member took place in their office, while 
conversations with other key informants took a more personal tone. A local community 
board president invited me to eat Lechona and Tamales, traditional Colombian dishes 
during his interview. Leaders of the organizations interviewed had many years of 
experience working in their respective roles, and were essential in the foundation of MC.  
In Bogota, I also visited one of the four functioning MC farmers’ markets. A main 
objective of conducting analysis at this level was to explore how alternative food 
commercialization venue of MC unfolded in relation to the broader District and regional 
politics, as well as to analyze the experience of peasants working in the market. The 
interviews conducted included questions regarding their business history, relationships 
with the locality, peasant organizations and consumers. Another set of questions were 
made to explore how peasants understood, participated, and made claims with the 
organizations mentioned at the policy level, and how policies the district implemented 
altered their work. Local community leaders were important stakeholders interviewed at 
this level, since they logistically supported local MCs, and allowed those standing to 
continue in their respective localities (See Chapter 4). To maintain anonymity, I changed 





I came to Bogota to observe and understand a process that I was not a part of, a 
struggle for peasants from the central region of Colombia to directly provide the food 
they produced in neighboring municipalities to residents of the country’s capital. My 
research did not come from the request of peasant organizations, international NGOs, or 
government authorities I interacted with during the field research. However, I consider 
myself as an ally of the wider struggle for democratic and egalitarian production and 
commercialization, and insertion of political deliberation into questions about how food 
is produced, distributed and sold. This means that I am dedicated to supporting the local 
alternative food markets and organizations I have worked with. My research was thus 
grounded in concerns for Mercados Campesinos to continue as they had for the past 
twelve years, as a collective practice benefiting the livelihoods of peasants and the 
nutritional needs of poor residents in Bogota.  
The research seeks to better understand processes of food sovereignty 
construction between state, society, and community actors, with a particular emphasis on 
how they negotiate with each other to implement food policies meant to improve rural 
development and feed urban populations. This work, apart from being a contribution 
towards food sovereignty literature, attempts to contribute to the challenges of 
negotiating around not only competing visions of peasant organizations and the state, but 
also between peasant organizations themselves. As I observed, the “peasantry” and 
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members of different peasant organizations managing Mercacados Campesinos exhibited 
tensions and contradictions within peasant movements and populations that are far from 
being homogenous. These findings in no way seek to discredit peasant movements, but to 
recognize the process of food sovereignty construction, the multiple discourses and 
interests, and the “unity in diversity” of civil society organizations in the interest of 
advancing the political and material goals of the peasants participating in Mercados 
Campesinos.  
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
 
Chapter Two provides a brief history and of Bogota’s food system, and the role of 
peasants in it. The Chapter outlines the various distribution and commercialization chains 
that have traditionally made up Bogota’s food system. I will describe the rise of market 
plazas throughout the city from the 19th century to the mid-20th century, and the 
establishment of the Corporation of Supply Markets of Bogota, [Corporación de Abastos 
de Bogotá, CORABASTOS], Bogota’s largest wholesale market association, as the 
state’s attempt organize food marketing, centralize and rationalize food distribution 
throughout the city. The chapter introduces the increase of market-share of national and 
international supermarkets, starting in the 1980s’, which have managed to control all 
aspects of production and marketing, and food retail in Bogota. A historical glance 
situates Colombian peasants’ food sovereignty efforts within a broader food system.   
Transformation of food commercialization in the city demonstrates how an increase in 
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the number of actors in the regional food system (producers, intermediaries, wholesale 
markets, and sellers, regulatory institutions, regional, municipal, and state authorities), 
and the concentration of market power among a small number of wholesalers and 
supermarkets have posed a challenge for peasants seeking to participate in and influence 
food policy. This section points to the district’s historical role in food systems planning. 
Furthermore, it introduces peasants surrounding the metropolitan core as a marginalized, 
but essential actors that have mobilized to present economic and political alternatives for 
Bogota’s food system. 
Chapter Three provides a contextual analysis of the recent debates over MC. 
Following Schiavoni’s relational framework of food sovereignty analysis, I will identify 
and describe the main actors and institutions involved in the formulation of food policies 
of Bogota and the surrounding rural departments. This section explores the different 
meanings and claims that these actors pursue, analyzing the discourses and practices of 
peasant organizations, international NGOs, and District officials to understand the 
political interaction between the main actors influencing food sovereignty construction 
within the PMASAB.  
Chapter Four describes the field work I conducted in a local MC in Bogota during 
the summer of 2016 to understand the efforts of peasants towards collective and 
autonomous organization to improve their livelihoods, production and commercialization, 
as well as to create urban-rural linkages between producers and consumers. I contrast the 
peasants actions with the most recent actions of the District to bypass peasant and 
international organizations to set up their own version of the Mercados Campesinos, 
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removing collective and associative aspects of previous years, and leaving it to municipal 
institutions to choose “entrepreneurial peasants”. This chapter provides implications over 
the difficulties of MC and other food sovereignty programs to maintain autonomy vis a 


















Chapter 2: Bogota’s Food System 
 
FROM COLONIAL MARKET TO A MODERN FOOD SYSTEM 
 
One of the first things leaders in Colombia’s peasant organizations mentioned 
about the MC program was the historical roots of peasant markets as part of the early 
commercial practices in the city. A spokesperson for ADUC stated that the project was as 
much an alternative to the mainstream food system as it is part of a historical tradition in 
Bogota. She commented, “In 1810, the Bolivar Plaza (Bogota’s main city square) was an 
important scene for peasant markets; it was from there that compatriots of Nueva 
Granada gained their independence. Thanks to the peasant markets. This is a historical 
and cultural legacy for our peasants” (Angela, interview, July 28, 2016) This and other 
accounts refer to the foundational date of the Colombian nation’s independence on 
Friday, July 20th of 1810. What the organization leaders emphasize is the importance of 
the weekly market in the main city plaza (known as Plaza Mayor prior to the 
independence) as a catalyst for the beginning of the revolutionary movement, and hence 
the creation of the Colombian nation-state.  
During Colonial times, most the food that reached the city was commercialized in 
small grocery stores (pulperias), and in the weekly market in the main city plaza. The 
weekly market represented a break from the quotidian days and rigid social structures of 
Bogota’s daily life, where peasant men and women came from the countryside to sell 
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their products. In the market, multitudes of people from different classes, sellers and 
consumers interacted regardless of social status. The market was a space in which city 
inhabitants could supply their food needs and maintain social and cultural orders 
established, such as dress codes and manners, that were reaffirmed with the trade 
interaction between residents and visiting sellers. This space also represented a series of 
established economic, social and cultural connections between countryside and Bogota 
(Ojeda, 2008). 
In August of 1861, the governor of the Bogota, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, 
published a decree prohibiting the market in the main plaza, by the time referred to as 
Plaza Bolivar, moving it to other smaller plazas in the vicinity. The decree reasoned that 
the move was to improve the main plaza, enclosing it from the public and away from of 
public administrative offices and the main cathedral. For Mejia (2000), urban changes 
between the early 19th to the beginning of the 20th century represented a rupture from 
the colonial social system to a reconfiguration of urban spaces, best encapsulated by 
conceptions of order. The removal of popular market outside of the main plaza, dispersed 
in different areas of the city represented such reconfiguration. As Castro (1994) 
emphasizes, this signified the “triumph of the Republic”. 
By January of 1864, city administrators inaugurated the Concepción market plaza, 
in an enclosed space in what used to be a convent, as the first of its kind in the city to 
provide spaces where the increasing urban populations could find quality food. The 
market was expanded in 1880 and again in 1893, with the addition of a building 
specifically designed for the sale of meat. Population in the city expanded from 20,000 
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inhabitants in the beginning of the 19th century to 112,000 in the beginning of the 20th 
century and the Concepción market was not able to supply such population growth, 
which forced city officials to allow other markets to stay open, and to create other market 
plazas (Mejia, 2000). 
Nonetheless, Plaza de la Concepcion became the main space for food distribution 
and retail in the city until 1953, when it was demolished and wholesalers moved to a 
series of vacant lots in the Spain Plaza [Plaza España], still located in the center of the 
city. However, the change did not mean further planning or changes in the infrastructure 
of food trade in the cityv(Silva, 1976). The locality of Plaza España, previously a 
residential zone in the downtown area of Bogota became a complex mix of wholesale 
bodegas, congested with trucks bringing, cantinas, private and public offices, family 
homes, brothels, and street vendors. For city officials, the chaotic conditions of the plaza 
had to stop.  In 1972, after extended negotiations between merchants, wholesalers, and 
city officials, Plaza España was militarized, evacuated, and moved outside the city center 
to  the current facilities of CORABASTOS(Alvarez, Rudas, & Elcy, 1991). 
The closure of Plaza España and the creation of the CORABASTOS wholesale 
market represents one of the main aspects of developmentalist thought put in practices 
throughout the 20th century in Latin America, as the government decided to sustain the 
dramatic growth of urban populations coming from rural areas (Guarin, 2009). Studies 
conducted by the Latin American Marketing Institute, ILMA (a division of FAO), and the 
Latin American Market Planning Center, LAMP, argued against the perceived 
inefficiencies of traditional markets in cheaply feeding the growing city populations. The 
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inefficiencies included the heterogeneous aspect of Colombia’s agricultural sector; lack 
of standardization, grading, transportation and packaging, and conservative practices that 
avoided innovation and competition (Guarin 2009, p. 53). 
The state did not achieve its desired goas to centralize food distribution, reduce 
food prices, and make food commercialization more efficient. Instead, the new conditions 
of the wholesale markets, including improved transformation, logistics, and information 
gave a small percentage of wholesalers (20 percent controlling 60 percent the volume of 
food traded) consolidated power and advantage to take part in economies of scale, 
improved their bargaining ability, and increased their profit margins (Guarin 2009, p. 55).  
Despite the inefficiencies taking place, most trade in of fruits and vegetables still 
take place in CORABASTOS. Between 5500 and 7500 tons of food, mostly perishables, 
arrive at the wholesale center every day from all over the country to be sold in Bogota, 
and rerouted to other regional markets. The consolidated group of merchants, who buy 
and sell large quantities of food, largely determine the price of foods of most the products 
that are sold in Colombia. Apart from the wholesalers, the city is mostly supplied by 
thousands of smaller merchants who buy, sell and reassemble products for more than 
120,000 corner stores, 2500 butchers, and 1500 retail points including market plazas like 
the ones mentioned earlier (Guarín, 2013). These traditional retail points mostly cater to 
poorer area of the city, while supermarkets sell to middle and high-income costumers.  
CORABASTOS, while being of major importance to the trade of perishables such 
as fruits and vegetables, has lost much its importance in market share of food distribution 
to supermarkets. A radical transformation of the Colombian retail sector began in the 
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early 1990s through economic liberalization, receiving over US$3 billion through direct 
investments into the retail sector between 1997 and 2007. One of the effects of the 
increase in supermarket has been in the wholesale (downstream) effects of market share, 
becoming substantial buyers of fresh produce. At the same time of expansion sales of 
supermarkets and hypermarkets jumped by 43%, and the number of stores nearly tripled. 
Foreign retail stores, such as Carrefour and Exito lead the supermarket retail market 
share, which mostly target their sales to middle and wealthy costumers. Supermarkets 
have achieved these increases by establishing their own procurement channels. 
Nonetheless, these large chains still rely on wholesale markets, sourcing a tenth of their 
fresh produce and a quarter of their produce (Guarin, 2013). 
 Although supermarket expansion has affected the retail sector, Guarin (2013) 
argues that the most important shift has been a movement away from market plazas. The 
author attributes this to the financial troubles of these state-owned markets, which many 
of which have shut down or fallen into disrepair since the 1980s, likely due to cultural 
shifts and the appeal of all-in one supermarkets or smaller retail stores. In 2005, the 
percent volume of tons of fresh produce retailed was 10 in public plazas was percent, 
compared to 39 percent in small retail stores, and 38 percent in supermarkets.  
 
PEASANTS ECONOMY IN COLOMBIA 
 
Peasant economies play an integral part in the city’s food supply chain. As noted, 
a few but powerful wholesalers control the assembly and distribution of food, while a 
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multitude of retailers, including corner stores and supermarkets sell directly to 
consumers. The peasant economy forms the other part of the hourglass chain in the city’s 
food system. Nationally, peasant farming, characterized by small-scale (less than three 
hectares) accounts for half of the volume of fresh fruits and vegetables produced (Guarin, 
2009, p. 63). Regionally, according to the PMASAB, 2.8 million tons of produce entered 
Bogota in 2002, of which around 75 percent of the food was produced by peasant 
farmers, and 25 percent by capital intensive and technical farming (Alcaldia Mayor de 
Bogotá, 2006).  
The MC program has as one of its goals to revive traditional structure of farmers’ 
market, but market modernization through supermarkets, and the expansion of retail 
stores, as well as the strength of wholesale distributors poses challenges to alternative 
solutions for peasant farmers.  The PMASAB as first conceived, placed interest the 
modernization of commercialization venues like public market plazas, focused on high 
public investment of public infrastructure, and on the control of private capital. Peasant 
organizations, alongside other civil society actors, argued that such plans would have the 
effect of excluding thousands of people tied to functioning of the current food system, 
mainly small landholding peasants. In this case we see the states’ continual aim to 
‘develop’ the peasantry, including food production and commercialization methods, in 
ways that peasant organizations found detrimental to peasant autonomy.  
 
PEASANT MOBILIZATION AND THE RISE OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSES 
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Peasant mobilization in Colombia has historically been one of regional struggles 
against processes of land concentration and displacement of peasant populations to 
marginal areas of the main cities in the country (as well as the displacement of millions of 
indigenous, and Afro Latino Colombians) (Carvajal Sanchez, 2011; LeGrand, 1986; 
Tovar Pinzón, 1975). Peasants have been at the center of a history marred by war, 
violence, drug trade, and armed conflict over the control of land and resources. Alejandro 
Reyes Posada (2016) sees Colombia as offering “the image of a living museum of 
conflicts” in different regions of the country: continued colonization and expulsion of 
indigenous groups in the agricultural frontiers of the Amazonian region; conflict between 
landless peasants and a group of small, but politically powerful regional landowners in 
the Atlantic coast; and the conflict between guerrilla groups such as the ELN, the Farc, 
and contract companies of the oil industry to capture oil rents and control over oil 
pipelines in Barranca Bermeja, el Catatumbo, and Arauca in the northeastern region of 
the country.  
Even so, the central region of Colombia, where many of the peasants participating 
in MC have come from, has not been exposed to the level violence of other parts of the 
country. As Posada explains, large scale conflict over land has been relatively absent in 
this region; the central problem, rather, is the unequal exchange between the urban 
economy and low inversion and returns to the rural economy, which has affected the 
economic conditions of the peasantry in the region. Apart from unequal land distribution, 
the main issue in the central region is an economic one, where although peasants have 
been an integral part of the economy, they have nonetheless been excluded and are at 
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great disadvantage from the food distribution and commercialization chains. Land 
transportation has been an issue for the rural communities, which have been marginalized 
from engaging in commerce because of the low quality of roads (See Chapter Four). 
The issues peasant have experienced in the central region of Bogota prompted a 
group of peasant organizations to unite in Bogota. In 2003, 12 national peasant 
associations, two regional associations, Afro Colombian and Indigenous organizations, 
worker unions, and student organizations gathered in what became the first National 
Agrarian Congress. As a leader of the FENSUAGRO organization stated, there have been 
attempts at agrarian reforms, but none of these have been applied to benefit the needs of 
small to medium farmers in Colombia. (Carlos Julio, interview, August 22, 2016). As a 
result, the groups meeting in the National Agrarian Congress set of 14 issues of 
importance in the agrarian sector of Colombia, which included human rights, women’s 
rights, land rights, and sovereignty, autonomy, and food security. Finalizing the 
Congress, the parties drafted and signed the Mandato Agrario (Agrarian Mandate). Of the 
fourteen points that make up document, the one on food sovereignty included a passage 
encouraging the autonomous and sovereign production, distribution, consumption 
through a production system meant to generate basic goods to fulfill the nutritional and 
cultural needs of consumers. This point laid out the basis for Mercados Campesinos as 
alternative commercialization venue whereby regional and peri-urban small farmers 
could produce, distribute, and sell their products directly to consumers in Bogota. 
The following chapter continues with the recent history of peasant mobilization to 
influence food policies in Bogota, and their efforts to construct food sovereignty as one 
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of the main aspects of Bogota’s food system. As the chapter explores, peasant ideas of 
food sovereignty were not one-dimensional; they contrasted and clashed against state 
notions of modernization and further efficiency of the food system. Even within peasant 

















Chapter Three: Food Sovereignty Construction in Bogota, Colombia 
 
PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS AND STRUGGLES TOWARDS AUTONOMY 
  
The following chapter demonstrates how key actors within Bogota’s food system 
understand and articulate different sets of claims and discourses to influence food policy. 
Drawing on Schiavoni (2016), the chapter situates the interaction between different actors 
as a continuing process through time. The analysis therefore sees food policy as an open-
ended process that is continually contested and defined by a different set of actors. That 
is, the very meaning and practices of food sovereignty are shaped by often competing 
paradigms and approaches. 
The relational approach, as suggested by recent literature on food sovereignty 
(Shattuck, Schiavoni, & VanGelder, 2015), attempts to resolve contradictions within food 
sovereignty discourses. In the case of Bogota, regional and peasant organizations, District 
agencies, and representatives of local communal boards, were key players in the debates 
over the goals and strategies set forth in Bogota’s 2006 Master Plan for Food Security 
and Supply [Plan Maestro de Abastecimiento y Seguridad Alimentaria, PMASAB] 
institutionalized through District Decree 315. Peasant organizations managed to introduce 
food sovereignty as one of the defining principles of the PMASAB, as “the rights of 
peoples to define their own policies and sustainable strategies of production, distribution 
and consumption of foods that guarantee the right to food for its population, based on 
small and medium production, respecting the cultures and diversity of agricultural 
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production, commercialization and management of rural spaces of peasants, fishermen 
and indigenous peoples, in which women play a fundamental role” (Alcaldia Mayor de 
Bogotá, 2006). 
Furthermore, the PMASAB established Mercados Campesinos as a 
commercialization venue where regional and peri-urban small farmers would be able 
produce, distribute, and sell their products directly to consumers in Bogota. Peasant 
organizations hailed the MC program as an autonomous, and alternative 
commercialization venue where farmers could effectively bypass intermediaries and 
wholesale distribution centers, cutting out middlemen to raise their incomes through fair 
prices earned by selling directly to consumers.  
The chapter explores the following problematic: peasant discourses for food 
sovereignty, and Mercados Campesinos, are formulated and interpreted within Bogota’s 
PMASAB, a city and regional food policy based on different sets of discourses and 
practices on how to resolve pressing issues in distribution and malnutrition of Bogota. 
Peasant organization make claims for sovereignty and right to self-government and 
autonomy; however, while they call for autonomy and for separation from the state, they 
at the same time require the state to guarantee such rights.   
The search of peasant organizations to gain autonomy, while relying on the state 
to institutionalize food sovereignty food sovereignty movements presents a contradiction 
that the food sovereignty literature has debated on the relation between food sovereignty 
and food policies that states adopt and implement (Clark, 2016; Cockburn, 2014; McKay 
et al., 2014; Schiavoni, 2015). For Ploeg (2009), a central aspect to the peasant condition 
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is the struggle for autonomy in a context of dependency relations that lead to 
marginalization and deprivation. Peasants aim to create and develop self-controlled and 
self-managed resource bases to allow co-production of man and nature that interact with 
the market, enlarge their resource production base, and thus increase autonomy and 
reduce dependency. However, how can peasants achieve autonomy while at the same 
time requesting access to markets, and state sponsorship? The case of peasant 
organizations in Colombia exemplifies this dilemma, where peasant movements have 
become entwined with the state, becoming dependent on District policies for access to 
market, monetary funds, and recognition, while at the same time making calls for 
political and economic autonomy. As opposed to separating themselves from the state, 
peasant organizations sought to interact within it, as well as dominant market conditions, 
and contest them at the same time. 
At the heart of this chapter is the attempt to explore this contradiction. How do 
different actors participating in the food sovereignty construction understand and 
articulate claims to influence and participate in domestic food systems in particular 
geographical settings? 
Focusing on the relationship between peasant groups, the state, and the market helps to 
resolve these binaries. As Shattuck et al state, “rather than regarding food sovereignty as 
being either ‘of the state’ or ‘of peoples/communities’, one to the exclusion of the other, 
understanding sovereignty as relational leaves room for different sovereign actors to 
coexist, with the terms of their engagement under ongoing negotiation, including which 
state agencies/powers are worth engaging with in any given moment” (2015, p. 425). In 
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adopting this line of argument, peasant movements simultaneously call for the state to 
recognize sovereignty rights of peasants while attempting to assert their own autonomy. 
It is therefore important to see how peasant food sovereignty movements fare by 
interacting with state and market actors, as well as how state agencies respond and relate 
to movements. 
This chapter identifies and describes the main actors and institutions involved in 
the formulation of food policies of Bogota and the surrounding rural Departments. This 
helps show the different meanings and claims that these actors pursue and help answer 
how different actors view food sovereignty and Bogota’s food policies; the respective 
roles of state and social actors that determine food policy; the values and principles 
driving different actors, and the commercialization models that result from different food 
policies.  
One of the first actors to be understood is Bogota’s District. More specifically, the 
chapter analyzes the District’s PMASAB, a District effort aimed at guaranteeing food 
security in the city, and improving perceived inefficiencies within the regional food 
system. In the early 2000s Bogota’s officials began to concern themselves with issues of 
food distribution and malnutrition in the city. In 2004, Bogota’s Mayor Luis “Lucho” 
Garzon, concerned with poverty and exclusion called his administration’s Economic 
Development plan ‘Bogota Without Indifference [Bogota Sin Indiferencia]. The Plan 
expressed the city’s social commitment against poverty, and promoted the articulation of 
policies and strategies to guarantee food and nutritional security. Alongside the Economic 
Development plan, Mayor Garzon created the program Bogota Without Hunger [Bogota 
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Sin Hambre] which focused on providing food to poorer areas of Bogota by 
implementing community and youth dining halls. Strategies to achieve food security, 
according to key sections of the plan, followed a modernizing paradigm based a 
neoliberal logic of state intervention that would allow proper market conditions to 
emerge. 
A second set of actors to be understood are the regional and national peasant 
organizations. This chapter outlines peasant organizations’ political interaction with the 
state, and how they became involved in debates about the outcome of the PMASAB. The 
food policy first promoted by the District, based on increased market efficiencies, 
improved transportation, and integration of distribution chains contrasted with peasant 
organizations’ visions for an alternative production, distribution and commercialization 
chains recognizing peasant production and promoting peasant autonomy. Peasant 
organizations directly challenged a policy that would potentially threaten peasant 
livelihood practices, and thus sought to protect themselves by engaging directly with the 
state. 
As the analysis of the PMASAB demonstrates, the outcome of food policies 
aiming to reform include within them a variety of meanings, with different perspectives 
that often conflict and contradict with each other. Although the District’s main food 
policy includes within it the concept of food sovereignty and Mercados Campesinos as 
part of the plan, it is not clear how the plan has increased participation of peasant 
organizations in determining food policies. If anything, the government actions of the city 
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ultimately reduced the input and participation of peasant organizations in the MC 
program (See Chapter Four) 
 
POLITICAL PRESSURE AND THE MAKING OF THE PMASAB 
 
After the Agrarian Congress of 2013, regional and national organizations set up 
an assembly, made up of peasants coming from 53 municipalities from the departments 
of Cundinamarca, Boyaca, Tolima, Meta, Huila, Santander, Casanare, and Guaviare. 
During this meeting, the organizations established the Comite de Interlocucion 
Campesino y Comunal (CICC) as a broader association for dialogue and deliberation for 
the organizations.  
Several regional and national peasant organizations participated in the 
establishment of the CICC and the debate leading up the final draft of the PMASSAB. 
These included the San Isidro Foundation, a peasant organization from the Department of 
Boyacá that focused on capacity building, peasant organizing and management; the 
National Association of Peasant Women, a women’s union focusing on social service and 
defense of peasant women; the Colombian Peasant Association [Asociacion Campesina 
Colombiana], a peasant union made up of regional ,municipal, and local peasant 
organizations; the National Association of Solidary Help [Asociacion Nacional de Ayuda 
Solidaria], an association focused on attending and accompanying war victims, and 
advocating for international human rights; and the Confederation of Communal Action 
Boards [Confederacion de Juntas de Accion Comunal] which unites local communal 
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boards from the city in support of promoting solidarity and self-help practices of local 
communities in Bogota (ILSA, 2010) 
The other main organization is the Federacion Sindical Unitaria Agropecuaria, 
FENSUAGRO, the largest agricultural workers union in Colombia. Founded in 1976, the 
union is present in 23 Departments in the country, with more than 80 thousand members 
(Semana, 2009a). Of the Colombian organizations mentioned, FENSUAGRO is part of 
Via Campesina, the international peasant organization calling for food sovereignty (See 
Chapter One). 
FENSUAGRO’s aim for agrarian reform has met with violence from paramilitary 
groups and persecution from the state. From 1986, more than 400 members of the 
organization have been killed (ILSA, 2010). Furthermore, the state has made claims 
about ties between FENSUAGRO and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) guerrilla group, and has arrested members leading members of the syndicate 
(“Colombia,” 2013; Semana, 2009b). 
As the largest regional and national peasant organizations promoting food 
sovereignty practices, ADUC and FENSUAGRO would become the main organizations 
interacting with the District in drafting the PMASAB and organizing local MCs. They 
would work together alongside the international nonprofits of  ILSA and Oxfam, but 
eventually separated because of organizational and ideological differences.   
 
ENTER THE PMASAB 
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In 2004, leaders from the CICC found out about a draft of the PMASAB, a plan 
originally unknown to the public. Jesús Aníbal Suárez, representative of the Agrarian 
Program at ILSA, got a hold of a draft of the plan, and shared it with peasant 
organizations. ILSA, and peasant organizations thought that the plan was based on 
finding minimal prices for food supplies, without considering the need of producers, and 
it was not aware of the benefits of peasant access to markets to reduce rural poverty 
(Pesquera, 2011). As Efrain, one of the organizational leaders stated, the original drafted 
plan had no mention of the peasantries’ importance of feeding the city. He also claimed 
that the plan had a neoliberal focus to it, claiming that it would hand over control of fresh 
agricultural products, processed and meat products to large capital interests. According to 
Efrain, the idea of the PMASAB began with previous mayors of Bogota, Enrique 
Peñalosa and Antanas Mockus, as part of a national Territorial Ordering Plan [Plan de 
Organizacion Territorial, POT] which aimed to create 12 master plans for municipal 
governments in Colombia organize their cities (See Government Planning as a Contested 
Process). According to Efrain, Peñalosa believed that the candidate he supported for the 
2003 Bogota Mayor election, Juan Lozano Ramirez, would win to support his business-
friendly food master plan, but the social democrat Luis Eduardo Garzon won the local 
elections. (Efrain, interview, July 26, 2016). 
Concerns over draft prompted peasant organization leaders to establish a dialogue 
with the recently elected Mayor Garzon. The new mayor had demonstrated support for 
the agrarian congress of 2003 and was willing to speak with peasant organizations to 
allow peasant organizations to take part in  ‘Bogota Without Hunger’ plan (Hernan, 
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interview, August 2, 2016). ILSA managed to assemble more than 100 people in a series 
of reunions to come up with proposals to pressure Mayor Garzon. Peasants formulated a 
series of demands tied to the Mayor’s agenda: peasants wanted to be part of the solution 
to get rid of hunger in the city, and their production could solve the alimentary problems 
(Pesquera, 2011). 
During this time peasant organizations started setting up small farmers’ markets 
throughout the city, as well as the larger market in Plaza Bolivar in November 4, 2004. 
These markets, were initially funded by the Swedish Embassy in Colombia (Efrain, 
interview, July 26, 2016; interview, Carlos Julio, August 22, 2016). It was in these first 
attempts to set up farmers’ markets, and to politically influence the PMASAB that 
peasant organizations began coordinating the Municipal Peasant Committees, [Comites 
Campesinos Municipales, CCM]. 
 The CCM’s first took form as a strategy for peasant organizations to 
include as many peasants in the conversation to include language of peasant economies in 
the food master plan. As part of the peasant organizations’ focus on the right of peasants 
to participate in their own food policies, the CCM allowed peasants from different 
municipalities to become involved in the design, formulation and implementation of their 
demands for the PMASAB. The CCMs afterwards shifted their political goals to become 
the space in which participants of MCs sought to consolidate food supplies to consumers 
in Bogota:  CCMs served as the first venue for logistical commercialization purposes, 
which helped peasants aggregate the food supply between participating members and 
organize the necessary logistics for peasants to participate in the farmers’ markets. The 
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CCMs thus formed the basis for peasants to organize, have the necessary supply for 
wholesale, decide which members would travel to sell their products and the products of 
fellow members in the markets (ILSA, 2010). 
ILSA began to expand their process of political participation to 50 food producing 
municipalities outside of Bogota. Of these municipalities, 42 of the mayors publicly 
supported the peasant’s proposals(ILSA, 2012). ILSA also held conversations with 
CORABASTOS representatives in a tactical move to have the political influence of the 
wholesale distributors change the original plans of the PMASAB draft (Pesquera, 2011). 
On March 17, 2005,  a peasant leader representing CICC intervened in Bogota’s 
Council, inviting the councilmembers to visit a peasant farmers’ market that ILSA, 
Oxfam, and the CICC had set up in the building’s plaza (ILSA, 2012; Pesquera, 2011). 
As a result, the Municipal Council made the compromise to ask the Mayor to open a 
public debate on the PMASAB. Bogota’s Council also organized a series of public 
debates which started dialogues between the Mayor and producers from municipalities of 
the central region of Colombia. The Mayor’s office eventually acceded to revise the 
PMASAB, changing the concept “lowest food prices” written in the first draft to “just 
prices”. Furthermore, a Directive Committee was set up to implement the PMASAB, 
which included two representatives of the peasant organizations (Pesquera, 2011). After a 
year of deliberation between the Garzon’s administration, peasant organizations, ILSA, 
and Oxfam, the Mayor signed the PMASAB, Decree 315, on August 15th, 2006. 
Another important initial achievement was that with the Mayor’s administration, 
peasant organizations, Oxfam, and ILSA established the first pilot project for MC. Oxfam 
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took on the role of mediator in the process between the peasant producers and the 
District, while the project was to be administratively managed by ILSA. This was to 
become the structure of future partnerships, with the international organizations 
administrating the budget of the MCs, and the peasant organizations managing the CCM.  
 
MODERNIZING BOGOTA’S FOOD SYSTEM 
 
Even though peasant organizations, alongside international NGOs, managed to 
influence and change the language of the PMASAB, Decree 315 of 2006 set out a 
broader objective to promote changes in Bogota’s food system, considering cultural, 
operational and territorial factors aligning with the planning goals of the POT. The 
PMASAB was separated within three main policy lines. The first was a social policy to 
guarantee food security, fair prices, and quality foods. The second was policy based on 
operational strategies to democratize and make the distribution system more efficient; 
and the third a policy of regional integration to improve distribution and economic 
activities in the region (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). 
In setting the plan, the District directly managed and regulated the food system of 
Bogota’s and the central region of Colombia. Apart from the social policy aspects of the 
Decree, the plan saw a need to reorganize and decentralize distribution sources, claiming 
that the current food system, production, and distribution at the time lacked information, 
connectivity, credit, and proper logistical facilities to make it a more efficient system 
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required to mobilize large volumes of food needed for consumption (Alcaldia Mayor de 
Bogotá, 2006).  
The PMASAB was also concerned with lack of access to technologies, problems 
with intermediaries, food wastes, and the low impact of market plazas. The goals, as 
stated through article 5 of the decree directly addressed those issues. These included 
eliminating inadequate manipulation of products, producing quality products, and 
guaranteeing sanitary conditions for production, distribution, and commercial facilities. 
Another goal was concerned with a “cultural” transformation, aiming for behavioral 
changes of good practices in production, manufacturing, and industry; changes in practice 
of food manipulation, storage, and transportation, and promoting cultural changes to 
improve eating habits, including balanced diets, based on the consumption of healthy 
foods. One important aspect of the cultural goals of the decree is that it was also meant to 
induce agroecological practices, something that peasant organizations themselves 
promoted, and criticized that the District was obstructing in favor of more industrialized 
agricultural practices (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, 2006).  
Furthermore, the text sought to promote organization and integration of peasants 
and producers to increase productivity, as well as better management to allow for “just” 
prices of products, and improving the integration of value chains. The emphasis of on the 
“just” prices demonstrates the achievements of peasant organizations in influencing the 
language of the PMASAB. As Pesquera (2011) writes, the initial language focused on 
achieving the “lowest”  prices for consumers, whereas peasant organizations, ILSA, and 
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Oxfam pushed for “just” prices, which included the best prices for both consumers and 
producers.  
Important strategies to achieve the goals of the PMSAB included integration, 
management, participation and communication strategies between different levels of 
government, regions, and actors in the food system. The operative strategies focused on 
connecting the system to facilitate small and medium scale producers, industry, and 
commerce to an information system based on supply and demand. The operative 
strategies also focused on transforming the culture of participants of the system. Another 
important aspect was the strategic plan to build and enforce “logistic platforms”, as a 
counterpart to the centralized wholesale market of CORABASTOS,. The platforms 
would be made up by a network of already existing market plazas, sub regional food 
collection and wholesale commercialization centers, AGROREDES, and NUTRIREDES 
(Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006).   
 
PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND STATE RECOGNITION 
 
Through the process outlined above, peasant organizations, alongside 
international NGOs such as Oxfam and ILSA, managed to influence the PMASAB by 
amending it to recognize peasant economies, and food sovereignty as two of the main 
articles of the decree. The decree ended up emphasizing the importance of the production 
and commercialization of peasant economies as an essential factor against hunger and 
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malnutrition in the city and the region, and adopted food sovereignty as one of its 
defining characteristics. 
The PMASAB recognized that most of Bogota’s food is produced in the 
surrounding rural departments of Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Tolima y Meta, as well as the 
rural areas of Bogotá. In 2006, thirty three percent of basic food products consumed in 
Bogota were produced within a forty-kilometer radius and close to eighty percent within 
a radius of 300 kilometers. Of these, the PMASAB estimated that Peasants supplied 65 
percent of the city’s food (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). 
Article 10 of the plan laid out the management structure of the PMASAB. With 
the 2008 amendments to the plan, through Decree 040 of 2008, the Directive Council of 
the plan was made up by the Mayor of Bogota, and its delegate from the District 
Secretariat for Economic Development, The District Secretary of Health, Secretary of the 
Environment, the District Planning Secretary, the Director of the Institute for Social 
Economy, two representatives from Consulting Boards, a representative of peasant 
organizations, and a representative from District Local Communal Boards. Although the 
Economic Development Secretariat agency would manage the master plan, the directive 
council had the role to formulate objectives, set policies to guarantee participation of 
actors in the supply system, define strategies and programs to implement the PMASAB, 
strategies for public-private partnerships, determine use of funds, among other duties 
(Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). As conceived by the District, the master plan included 
participation and input from a variety of agencies and civil society groups 
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It was through the deliberation between the District and civil society groups that a 
political space opened for peasant organizations to participate, and influence food 
policies, institutionalizing the concept of food sovereignty. The PMASAB apart from its 
emphasis of on modernizing, integrating, and making production, distribution, and 
commercialization of food more efficient, at the same time contained language protecting 
and recognizing traditional peasant production. It also acknowledged Mercados 
Campesinos as one of the commercialization strategies of the plan. This seemingly 
contradictory goals of the PMASAB provide a glimpse into the different values and 
principles that peasant organizations seek as part of the future of their food system. 
However, even between peasant organizations, and the supporting NGOs Oxfam and 
ILSA, different values ideas on how to manage MCs and relate to the state emerged.  
 
MERCADOS CAMPESINOS, AND SEPARATION OF CICC MEMBERS 
 
From 2006 to 2011 the District’s Economic Development Secretariat, ILSA, 
Oxfam, and the CICC executed a series of partnerships that allowed for the 
implementation and development of the PMASAB’s goal of the commercialization 
channel for peasant economies, which resulted in Mercados Campesinos. ILSA and 
Oxfam presented the project outline, and oversaw the administration, and budget of the 
project. The length of the partnerships ranged from 6 months to more than a year. Project 
budgets also varied. The first partnership had a budget of 237 million pesos (around 
125,000 US dollars) with the Economic Development Secretariat providing 220 million 
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pesos and Oxfam and ILSA providing the rest. The partnership of 2009, which sought to 
further consolidate commercialization strategies of MCs, resulted in a budget of more 
than 1.4 million pesos (around 50,000 US dollars). Again, the District provided most of 
the funds, while ILSA and Oxfam were left to administrate the funds (ILSA, 2012). 
During this period 400 MCs took place in ten parks of eight neighborhoods of 
Bogota, and 7 larger markets in the Bolivar Plaza. MC organizers also began developing 
the Canal Corto distribution channel to fruit stores and market plazas in Bogota. In 2010, 
political incidence from the peasant organizations resulted in the signing of District 
Accord 455 of 2010, which institutionalized peasant markets for local, regional and rural 
economic development according to the alignments established in the PMASAB. The 
article made explicit the aim of MCs: “the participants of these temporal markers will be 
able to commercialize their agricultural products, organic and traditional crops, at the 
same time presenting their artistic expressions and other cultural values of their region.” 
(Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 2010) The article thus recognized a different peasant 
economy, with its distinct commercialization methods, variety of products produced, and 
unique cultures. Furthermore, the accord stated that the Bogota’s Secretariat of Economic 
Development would play a role in organizing and coordinating bi-weekly markets, as 
well as a larger market once a year in June to celebrate the national peasant day. 
Although the partnership between the District, ILSA, and Oxfam resulted in the 
accomplishments outlined above, leading peasant organizations began criticizing lack of 
control over the management of the MC projects. As Carlos Julio from FENSUAGRO 
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stated, the leadership of peasant organizations was very limited when it came to the 
management and administration of MC:  
From 2007 to 2010 the execution of the program was in the hand of the 
NGOs. many times the organizations didn’t consult us (peasant 
organizations) . . . they would say “Why would you want to administrate, if 
what you are is agrarian leaders, you are supposed to organize peasants.” 
But if we prepare ourselves we are also capable of administrating (the MC). 
Peasants do not only farm, but also administrates what they have (Carlos 
Julio, interview, August 22, 2017). 
Similarly, ADUC began challenging ILSA and Oxfam. The regional peasant 
association wanted to manage the budget of the markets. Andres, an ADUC leadership 
member stated thus:  
What we did was say that we did not want Oxfam or ILSA, but the peasants 
themselves to manage the budget of the market. We think that the peasant 
organizations today are sufficiently mature, and structured, with the optimal 
professional levels to manage the money of the District, because that was 
the excuse that ILSA had. They (ILSA) said that we did not know how to 
administrate, how to contract, how to do this or that. But I said that peasants 
do know how to do that, and they demonstrated it, where the government 
made partnerships for three years directly with the peasantry (Andres, 
interview, August 17, 2017). 
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During the tenure of Mayor Gustavo Petro, the District ended the partnerships with 
Oxfam and ILSA, and established separate partnerships with FENSUAGRO and ADUC, 
from 2012 until the end of 2015. The organizations began executing the partnerships 
directly with the District, and Oxfam continued providing support for ADUC, but no longer 
held administrative control of the MC markets (Andres, interview August 17, 2016). 
The separate partnerships between the District and the two major peasant 
organizations was the result of a breakup of the CICC. As Carlos Julio stated “ADUC, 
FENSUAGRO, and ALCAMPO were one process. But the organizations began to break 
up. There were ideological differences” (Carlos Julio, interview, August 22, 2017). It is 
difficult to have a single explanation of why the organizations separated, but the different 
goals, visions and relationships with the state point to possible reasons.  
FENSUAGRO’s efforts for agrarian reform and food sovereignty center on class 
struggle and peasant identity. As Carlos Julio, spokesperson for FENSUAGRO stated that 
the union seeks to defend the proletariat the peasants who are having a difficult time. 
FENSUAGRO is one of Colombia’s most active organizations calling for land reform, and 
in doing so emphasize peasant identity politics. As part of their reform goals, 
FENSUAGRO conceives food sovereignty a right for peasant communities to develop their 
own agrarian policies. This implies on not depending on other countries for food, or food 
production, as well as the ability for peasants to produce their own regional seeds and 
products. Carlos Julio differentiated FENSUAGRO’s aims for food sovereignty with the 
FAO’s concepts of food security. He said “they (with food security) guarantee food, but 
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not where the food comes from, and what type of food” (Carlos Julio, interview August 
22, 2016). 
ADUC, on the other hand, provided a discourse aligning more with the goals of the 
PMASAB, including the District’s aim of achieving food security for the city. The regional 
association saw the construction of peasant economies as hinging on a relationship with 
the state, which varied was never stable throughout the partnerships forged since 2007. 
According to Andres, a member of ADUC, the peasant organizations in the beginning were 
essential for the District’s public policy to accomplish the PMASAB. The District sought 
allies like ADUC that allowed them to guarantee their obligation to provide healthy food 
for everyone in the city. For ADUC, therefore, the relationship with the state was a 
contractual one, with a set of obligations of both parties to accomplish a state plan (Andres, 
interview, August 17, 2016).  
While FENSUAGRO sought to strengthen the economic and political 
independence of the peasantry, ADUC chose instead to continue forging alliances with 
Oxfam and local community leaders, as well as compromising with the District to continue 
the MC program. FENSUAGRO criticized ADUC’s willingness to make deals with the 
government and organizations that perhaps would not benefit peasants. As Carlos Julio 
stated, “before supporting a liberal or conservative candidate, we are defending the less 
favored classes. We won’t accept money if they offer it to us. If anything, we will first 
speak with the peasants.” (Carlos Julio, interview, August 22, 2016) 
When CICC separated, a group of smaller organizations stayed with 
FENSUAGRO, including ACC, ANDAS, San Isidro Foundation, FENACOA, and the 
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Association of Peasant Markets of Tolima, ASOMERCAMP. Apart from the latter two 
organizations, the previous ones that stayed as part of the CICC were larger national 
associations and syndicates.  
The rest of the organizations, ADUC, ANMUCIC, and a newer organization, the 
Mutual Agri-Food Mutual [La Mutual Agrocomunal Agroalimentaria, 
AGROCOMUNAL], united to form the association Peasant and Communal Alliance 
[Alianza Campesina y Comunal] ALCAMPO. This association sought to strengthen ties 
with communal leaders from different localities, and expand the reach of MC to allow local 
city artisans, as well as urban farmers of Bogota to participate in the local markets. The 
CICC and ALCAMPO, led by FENSUAGRO and ADUC respectively, made partnerships 
with the District, and established their own Mercados Campesinos, CICC keeping the 
initial name, and ALCAMPO renaming their markets Popular and Peasant Markets 
[Mercados Campesinos y Populares].  
 
GOVERNMENT PLANNING AS A CONTESTED PROCESS 
 
 The historical outline of peasant participation in the city and regional food policy 
of the PMASAB demonstrates how different societal actors participating in Bogota’s 
system understand and articulate a different set of discourses to influence food policies. 
Peasant organizations, NGOs, and the District interacted in a continuous process to 
establish the parameters and goals of the PMASAB, each with different ways of 
approaching the plan.  
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What can the goals and food system plan tell us about the vision, values and 
principles of the District? Ramirez Pascagaza (2013) writes about the limits and 
restrictions of the PMASAB. The plan, as the author argues, meant to overcome the 
“inefficiencies” of traditional commercialization that affects food distribution to Bogota. 
According to the author, the plan qualified the previous food system at the time as 
“chaotic”, “disjointed” and informal, which raises the prices of intermediation. Without 
going into depth about these qualifiers, the plan laid out sought to improve city access to 
food by strengthening urban-rural connections, reducing the costs of operation, 
optimizing efficiencies, and eliminating intermediation”. As Yepes et al (2005) argue, the 
District administration proposed an intervention that attempted to overcomes what they 
saw as technological backwardness, a system of informal relations institutionalized in 
CORABASTOS, and the and administrative budgetary issues of the wholesale market. 
The main proposition of the plan was therefore to modernize and make the system more 
efficient.  
Looking at the PMASAB in a broader scale, the plan was created in accordance to 
a national policy of territorial organization, The Territorial Ordering [Plan de 
Ordenamiento Territorial, POT]. The PMASAB was created in accordance to guidelines 
of broader national policies of territorial organization. The Territorial Ordering [Plan de 
Ordenamiento Territorial, POT]. The POT functions nationally as a technical and 
normative instrument, defines how a city makes use of its land. Law 388 of 1997 defines 
the POT as “the set of objectives, guidelines, policies, strategies, goals, programs, actions 
and standards, aimed at guiding and managing the physical development of the territory 
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and land use.” (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá, 1997). The plan thus serves to guide and 
prioritize investments in the territory of both the public sector and the private sector. That 
is, it defines where parks, schools, hospitals, housing, offices, shops and industries are to 
be located. In the context of Bogota, urban growth and migration towards city in the 
twentieth century gave rise to urban planning in the city. Further integration towards 
globalization, and increased economic activity helped authorities adopt a neoliberal 
development model to properly position cities in the international arena (Beuf, 2016). At 
the urban level, neoliberalism has reformulated social and political aspects of cities. As 
Brand states, the city-region in Latin America has become a key scale in global 
economies and has led to increase in urban competition. There is an emphasis on urban 
governments as a point of intersection between local, regional, and national policies; a 
process of restructuring of local governments and introduction of administrative and 
business techniques; a promotion of entrepreneurial culture; a restructure of work 
markets; privatization of rights, and a rise of the service sector (Brand, 2009). 
The spatial restructuring of cities, as in the case of Bogota, follows a specific 
logic in which power is decentralized from the state, but with continuing interference “at 
a distance” from those who exercise political power. Drawing on Foucault (2010), 
neoliberal policies are molded on principles of a market economy. As opposed to laissez-
faire models of market economy under neoliberalism, in which the state is separated from 
the economy, neoliberalism is characterized by positive and intervening liberalism (2010, 
p. 133). Intervention is key under neoliberalism, but it abandons direct state intervention. 
Intervention under neoliberalism is based on (1) regulatory actions, and (2) organizing 
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actions. Regulatory actions do not aim to intervene on mechanisms of the market, but on 
the conditions of the market. Regulation, then takes the form of reducing costs, reduction 
of profits of the enterprise, and localized tendency to increase production, either through 
price reduction or improved production. Organizing actions make up what Foucault calls 
“framework” policies, as those that attempt to fully integrate economic sectors into the 
market, such as technical improvements, laws, and education, that are not directly 
economic but that allow different sectors to work as markets (Foucault, 2010, p. 138). 
The POT, and in extension the Master Plans that the city created to can be seen as 
technologies which define the technical and operative parameters of a vision, what Rose 
(1996) calls a “political rationality”. As the outlined sections of the text demonstrate, the 
PMASAB works as part of a governmental program that outlines specific plans to reorder 
regional and urban distribution channels, implement technological improvements to 
modernize, and regulate the supply of food to the city, to guarantee availability, low 
prices for urban consumers.  
However, territorial ordering technologies like the PMASAB are not so one 
dimensional. As Carvajal Sanchez (2011) argues, community participation complicates 
processes of territorial planning. Within this urban reordering plan, diverse actors appear, 
with different intentions visions, and practices. The role of the state as the main leader 
exercising a vision of modernity, efficiency, and economic development is diluted and 
challenged by mobilized actors with different visions of how to manage their territory. 
Thus, the dynamics of territorial ordering must take into account the political interactions 
that take place within the geographical spaces in question.  
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Miller and Rose state that in analyzing techniques, classical terminologies such as 
state versus civil society, or public versus private are of little use. Government 
technologies, such as the PSMSAB do not solely emanate from the state. As the author 
states, “[I]in particular, the capacities that have been granted to expertise – the complex 
amalgam of professionals, truth claims and technical procedures  - provide versatile 
mechanisms for shaping and normalizing the ‘private’ enterprise, the ‘private’ firm, the 
'private' decisions of businessmen and parents and the self-regulating capacities of 
'private' selves in ways that are simply not comprehended in these philosophies of 
politics”(1990, p. 8) What is important to emphasize is that governing takes place beyond 
the state, as an arrangement of governance that includes horizontal association of 
networks of private, civil society, and state actors. In this sense, power is dispersed 
through wider governance at different geographical spaces.  
However, while governance opens spaces for civil society to participate in 
governance processes, it “is the state that plays a pivotal and often autocratic role in 
transferring competencies (and consequently in instantiating the resulting changing 
power geometries) and in arranging these new networked forms of governance” 
(Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 2001). It this sense, it follows that even though Bogota’s food 
system involves a wide array of actors, the state is still a powerful force determining food 
policies. 
The multiplicity of ideas, and plans of implementation between different actors 
are present in the PMASAB. As the following section shows, alongside language 
promoting efficiency, technological improvement, and increased production, seemingly 
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contradictory language promoting food sovereignty, peasant production, and respect of 
cultural practices is present. This reflects the decentralized and participatory nature of 
governance under neoliberal framework, in which although it pushes for an organization 
of food systems based on market logic, opens spaces for participation of multiple actors 
in the planning and decision-making process. 
 
PEASANT DISCOURSES AND PARTIAL AUTONOMY 
 
What can the political participation of peasant associations in the policy-making 
process of the PMASAB and their successful introduction of food sovereignty language 
into District food policies? Peasant organizations first united to push claims of food 
sovereignty. The main peasant organizations, ADUC, and FENSUAGRO, separated 
because of differences in how they related to the District to promote MCs in Bogota. 
However, apart from their differences, they advocated for autonomous peasant 
production and commercialization, as well as and peasant rights and recognition in 
Bogota’s food system. 
This means, as demonstrated by the history outlined above that the political 
interaction between peasant organizations and District authorities is one of partial 
autonomy. The two main demands of peasant organizations, in relation to MC is one of 
state recognition on the one hand, autonomous commercialization of food products. As 
claimed a report co-produced by the peasant organizations, ILSA, Oxfam, and the 
Economic Development Secretariat of Bogota, “Mercados Campesinos is an autonomous 
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initiative of communal and peasant organizations promoted to strengthen peasant 
economies” (ILSA, 2012). The sentence emphasizes the “autonomous” differentiation of 
“peasant economies” from the current production and commercialization model, which 
makes both producers and consumers dependent on final prices, and which is 
characterized by a dominance of intermediaries, and a monopoly of distribution centers, 
which further increase food prices.  
For example, a member of AGROCOMUNAL stated that by allowing peasants to 
sell their products to the final consumer, eliminating different chains of intermediation 
that makes the products more expensive, consumers acquire a just price and peasants 
improve their income. He stated the following 
Mercados Campesinos is an important source of food supply that need to 
be recognized. Peasants keep sustaining themselves, and improving the 
quality of life, and health services. The young ones stay in the fields and 
evade the poverty belt of the city. Those that can’t work in the field end 
move to the city and end up in the service sector, as security guards, as 
construction workers. These are not jobs that create well-being (Efrain, 
Interview, July 24, 2016) 
 In thinking about the role of MC in furthering peasant economies, the argument 
of peasant organization leaders about autonomy is one of peasant independence to 
continue their livelihoods. For peasant organizations, large scale agriculture, and state 
management of food distribution networks that the District included in the PMASAB 
would undermine small landholding peasant practices. For example, the food master plan 
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attempted to set up the 10 of the district market plazas as logistic platforms that will be 
used to transform, pack ad process food products. These would function as agriculture 
networks (AGROREDES) in the region, each specializing in a specific product (Alcaldia 
Mayor de Bogotá, 2006). This would create specific areas of monocrop production, 
which would decrease the ability of peasant farmers to diversify their own production. 
One network would cultivate blackberries, for example, leading to mass production of 
one product versus the multiple foods that peasants provide. These plazas would thus 
allow for the construction of a new development model that would transform peasant 
production practices (Efrain, interview, July 24, 2016). 
As peasant organization leaders mentioned, while the peasant organizations call 
for an autonomous production, distribution, and direct sale of food products to 
consumers, they see MC as a process of social repayment (reivindicación). That means, 
as stated by a communal leader “we have our own production. How is it that we need an 
intermediary, knowing that we can have direct relationship between the producer and the 
consumer? This does not mean that he or she (the peasant) is a trader, but that a space is 
established in which his labor will be recognized” (Gloria, interview, July 29, 2016). 
Angela, a spokesperson for ADUC also stated that “there is a social debt of the 
Colombian state towards our peasants, for feeding a nation, which has not been 
retributed” (Angela, Interview, July 28, 2016). With this language of social repayment, 
organizational leaders emphasized the recognition that they thought peasants deserved 
from the state, a social debt that the state needed to repay. Angela added that there is a 
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misrecognition of the importance of peasants, who continue to be segregated and 
displaced by Colombian violence.  
The concept of social repayment resembles what Scott established as the “right to 
subsistence”. As stated in the introduction, peasant claims are connected to their survival 
needs, and that the state, in the case of Bogota, should not infringe but rather provide the 
base level rights for peasants to subsist. In this sense, peasants in Colombia called for a 
respect and valuation of peasant economies, peasant rights, and participation in the 
decision-making process. The organizations in this case promoted peasants as political 
actors with rights, not just producers meant to provide goods and services based on 
consumer demands. They called for recognition of peasants as subjects with rights to 




With the new administration of Mayor Enrique Peñalosa, beginning 2016, the 
district let the partnerships with the organizations expire, temporarily halting the MC 
program throughout the city and putting in peril the continuation of the program (Cruz 
Roa, 2016). The Director of Bogota’s Economic Development Secretariat at the time, 
Freddy Castro, argued that there weren’t enough resources to implement the markets. 
Furthermore, he stated that administration had to revise previous partnerships related to 
inconsistencies in the handling of funds of the peasant organizations that have managed 
MC. He also said that District had to make sure that those people participating were “real 
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peasants” and that they were following sanitary and quality standards for the foods sold 
(Caicedo, 2016). By this he meant that the sellers in the market, instead of producing 
their own products, bought them at wholesale markets to resell them at local MC markets 
without proper food labeling or packaging standards.  
However, peasant organizations, and peasants themselves argued against 
government claims and instead pushed for the recognition of genuine food practices 
based on small-scale peasant production, with specific cultural practices, and norms. In 
the political context of Bogota, progressive mayors before Peñalosa were willing to 
provide funds and political support for peasant organizations and peasant practices within 
the PMASAB. From 2004 to 2011, peasant organizations, partnering with the 
international NGOs Oxfam and ILSA, managed to sign 6 different partnerships with the 
Economic Development Secretariat to support the MC program (ILSA, 2012). With the 
shift District government administration, mayor Peñalosa established different priorities 
from the previous Mayors, and one of the targets of the administration was dismantling 
the MC. 
The political shift shows the relational approach that exemplifies the limits of 
food sovereignty construction within urban and regional food policy. On the one side, the 
organizations that were part of the CICC did not want to negotiate with the District, since 
they thought whatever the compromise was to be would hurt peasants, and thus shut 
down operations of the MC markets they managed. On the other side, although peasant 
organization were claiming increased autonomy economic and political autonomy, 
members ALCAMPO also demanded recognition within the bounds of a food policy of 
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which depended on District management. ALCAMPO thus continued working with local 
communal board presidents to continue the farmers’ markets in their communities, while 
they continued negotiating with the District to re-establish the partnerships.  
Before continuing the discussion of the District’s efforts to alter the MC program, 
the following chapter explores the experiences of peasants who continued participating in 
MCs after the District ended the partnerships with peasant organizations. These peasants 
negotiated with communal leaders to sell products in different neighborhoods in the city. 
Although ALCAMPO continued supporting these markets, the organization’s influence 
was limited, and the peasants themselves continued to claim for autonomy by selling at 












Chapter Four: Peasant Autonomy and District Demands 
 
MERCADOS CAMPESINOS AND PEASANT PRACTICES OF AUTONOMY 
 
While the previous chapter focused on peasant organizations, international 
nonprofits, and the District as actors and institutions interacting food sovereignty 
formation, the following chapter will introduce my own observations and interview 
responses of peasant farmers, local community leaders, and artisanal urban sellers 
participating in the MC of a neighborhood in Bogota. By drawing on Ehlert Voßeme’s 
(2015), this chapter provides an actor oriented approach to observe and understand the 
experiences of actors bypassing the mainstream supply chain of Bogota through their 
practices in the local MCs. Focusing solely on the organizational discourses about the 
MC can disregard the individual discourses and practices of resistance that farmers from 
different areas of the central region of Colombia engaged in to continue selling food in 
local markets. As the author states, an actor oriented approach helps to demonstrate “the 
empirically visible manifold, complex, and heterogeneous struggles of peasants 
encountering, negotiating, and enacting development politics and programs in their 
everyday lives of farming routines and consumption practices, and thereby leave concrete 
and fundamental questions of power relations and sovereign agency ‘on the ground’ 
untouched” (Ehlert & Voßemer, 2015, p. 22). 
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The question I explored when focusing on the local MC experience was the 
following: What practices of autonomy do peasants engage in to promote food 
sovereignty?  
I extend the question of autonomy into the realm of the life experiences of these 
actors, the quotidian interactions between producers/sellers and consumers, and amongst 
peasants from different geographical areas selling their products in the same market. The 
peasants selling in the markets were not necessarily involved in the political process of 
organizing and directly challenging city food policies. Rather, they engaged in food 
sovereignty construction through their everyday practices which challenged the discourses 
and practices involved mainstream food distribution processes. Peasants, local producers, 
and artisanal sellers practiced diversified food production, bypassed food intermediaries, 
and sold their products at “just” prices to improve their livelihoods. By selling in the 
market, producers also aimed to establish direct connections with consumers that were not 
directly mediated by wholesale centers, supermarkets, or intermediaries. These 
connections help both producers and consumers reassess notions of food safety, freshness, 
and quality through direct reciprocity interactions. Consumers and producers interacted 
through impressions such as smell, shape, or color of products to determine the overall 
quality and safety at the time of selling and buying.  Furthermore, limited funds and 
institutional support around the time of my field research had forced peasants establish 
strategies to find transportation aggregating enough supplies to afford to continue selling 
directly to consumers.  
The interview responses of the questions asked varied from person to person, but 
existing participants of the MC shared common experiences of improved life and 
livelihoods, increased food production and commercialization, urban rural integration 
between producers and consumers. The farmers’ experiences were accompanied by 
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hardships, especially when it came finding transportation that would take them and their 
produce to the market, lack of government support and uncertainty about the future of the 
markets. Nonetheless, the hardships experienced to come to the market were offset by the 
perceived benefits that they gained out of the market, especially the perceived value to their 
labor, to the extent that most of them decided continue selling a large part of their products 
through the farmer’s market, instead of relying solely on the mainstream distribution and 
commercialization chains of Bogota.  
The experiences of the market was part of the District’s refusal to continue dealing 
with peasant organizations to manage the Mercados Campesinos. This chapter continues 
the tensions demonstrated between the District and peasants that pervades the MC 
experience, contrasting the discourses and practices of peasants with the District’s decision 
to continue the market, bypassing peasant organizations, and relying on institutional 
channels instead of the CCM associative process of peasants.  
 
A DAY IN THE MARKET 
 
The local MC I visited took place every two weeks. Peasants came from different 
municipalities in the departments of Cundinamarca, and Tolima, while two of those 
interviewed came from rural areas of Bogota. The market began in 2010 with the 
approval of the community board, specifically with the leadership of the community 
president. This market was only one of the seven continuing to function after Bogota’s 
Secretariat of Economic Development  decided to discontinue the partnership with 
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peasant, and international nonprofit organizations by the time I arrived to conduct 
fieldwork. 
Peasants and other participants in the market, such as urban farmers and artisans 
from the neighborhood arrived at the neighborhood the night before the market, any time 
from one to three in from their respective municipalities. As Silvio, coordinator of 
ADUC’s direct distribution program said, “they wake up at one in the morning, traveling 
terribly uncomfortable, surrounded by their food baskets, without sleeping, to come here 
and smile at their clients” (Silvio, interview, August 21, 2017). Sellers set up the market 
as soon as they arrived, unloading their food baskets and setting up tents, tables, and 
chairs that were stored in the communal board facility, which the peasant association of 
AGROCOMUNAL, and Oxfam had bought for the market. There were 14 tents in total 
which 2 to three families shared. Clients arrived as early as six in the morning, and the 
small venue, around the size of a basketball field quickly filled up with costumers early in 
the morning.  
One of ADUC’s members had put me in contact Alvaro, the communal board 
president of locality. He was the first person I met when I arrived. He let me know about 
the beginning of the market, the growth of it over the years, and their work with 
AGROCOMUNAL and Oxfam. He said that after the city halted funds for the market in 
the beginning of 2016, the communal board had to decide whether to discontinue the 
market or allow it to take place on the neighborhood grounds. Alvaro and communal 
board members talked with the people participating in the market, and they decided to 
continue the market. Farmers would pay the fee of $35,000 pesos (around $12 dollars) 
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and in exchange the communal board would store the tents, tables and chairs, and help 
them set up the markets every two weeks. Alvaro said that the market was as much a 
benefit for the communal board and residents of the neighborhood as it was for those who 
sold at the market, who with an end to government funding, and limited organizational 
support, decided to continue traveling to the market to sell whatever they came with from 




When I asked the people I interviewed why they began participating in the local 
MC, they emphasized that selling their products through intermediaries did not provide 
them enough income for their subsistence needs. The markets, although intermittent, 
provided sellers an additional source of income. The increase incomes came from higher 
prices of their products when compared to when they sold to intermediaries in their 
districts. The prices varied by products, but the clients were willing to buy products at a 
higher price than was determined by CORABASTOS. They thus saw the market as an 
alternative commercialization venue where they could sustain themselves and improve 
their livelihoods.  
Lucia had been working in local MCs for 11 years. She found out about the 
farmers’ through someone in the district of Cáqueza, Cundinamarca, who had previously 
participated in an MC. She decided to travel and try out selling at a MC. She had worked 
in different markets in other neighborhood markets for 5 years. She said she always 
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worked in the fields (el campo), cultivating and fruits and vegetables, as well as raising 
chickens. Lucia also cooked food for laborers and cultivated plants and flowers to sell at 
the market. 
Since the markets took place twice a month, Lucia had to rely on other sources of 
income, and sell what she couldn’t sell in the local market to intermediaries. Nonetheless, 
when compared to intermediaries, MC offered her a better opportunity to sell products. 
She stated: 
One doesn’t make anything there (selling to intermediaries), so one has to 
work here, because one is left with a little bit more money for the 
subsistence of the family. It is harder (mas berraco) to sell to 
intermediaries because one has to sell cheaper. This doesn’t mean that this 
is easy, one has to always rise early, get ready on Fridays, work to bring 
the best, harvest the best quality so that the client sees that one brings 
good products (Lucia, interview, August 20, 2016).  
Oscar had also worked at the local market for two years, coming from the 
municipality of Une, Cundinamarca, with his wife and son. He had worked in another 
MC starting in 2012 but the one he moved to was easier to travel to, as it was closer to his 
municipality. Oscar stated that he decided to work in the MC because there were too 
many intermediaries, and that he received less from the products he sold to intermediaries 
than the products he sold directly to consumers. For Oscar, the intermediary is the one 
who takes the profit. He explained 
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Let’s say the price of lentils traveling down. If the bag (bulto) sells for 
example at 50,000 pesos (around $16 dollars), they over there (at the farm) 
are paying 30, 000 pesos (around $9 dollars). So imagine, the gains are for 
them. One does not get anything from what one cultivates, and works hard 
for” (Oscar interview, July 30, 2016).  
For Oscar, the local MC was a benefit that has allowed him and his family to 
move forward, survive, and that even allowed his son to study.  
As these passages suggest, participants of the MC perceived the project as a 
benefit and improvement of their livelihoods. They compared their experience to the 
alternative of selling to intermediaries in the traditional wholesale market, which made it 
more difficult to sustain themselves. Working for intermediaries was an option for some 
who didn’t want their harvested products to go to waste, but participants saw working in 
the market an extra source of income, if not the main one. Furthermore, participants saw 
selling their products in the MCs as a worthwhile venture; they saw that the difficulties of 
finding transportation, traveling setting up late at night were offset by not only the 
income, but the opportunity to continue to produce and sell their products.  
Peasants selling at the local MC sought to maintain autonomy by seeking to 
produce and sell their products outside of the traditional distribution and super market 
chains of Bogota. The main contention of peasants when deciding to come sell at the MC 
was the problem of intermediaries. They were aware of the unequal terms and prices that 
intermediaries offered to most of the peasants. Those that did sell to intermediaries point 
to the challenge of having to sell surplus produce versus the limited amount they could 
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sell in the farmer’s market. The District has criticized MCs for being an inadequate venue 
to assure food security to Bogota’s citizens (Andres, interview, August 17, 2016). 
However, the peasants made a different argument. They had enough supply of food and 
only if more MC markets were available they would be able to sell even more of their 
produce at a fair price, instead of having to have their food either go to waste or sell it at 
too low prices for intermediaries. 
Another important point is that that peasants did not sell to merely increase 
profits, as a purely entrepreneurial farmer would. Instead, as the language in the 
interviews suggest, peasants spoke in terms of subsistence, valuing their livelihoods the 
most. Sellers at the market did not believe the current set up of the food system ensured 
their subsistence, as demonstrated by their negative reactions to intermediaries. 
 
IMPROVED FOOD PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIALIZATION  
 
As I interviewed sellers in the market, asking them about the changes they had 
experienced by selling in the market, their responses centered on the variety of products 
they harvested in small land plots ranging from less than a hectare (vanegada) to several 
hectares. As participants mentioned, they started selling their products in small quantities, 
but eventually expanded their production, and hence the amount of food and other 
products they sold at the local market. 
Yesenia had been traveling with her husband, daughter and son from the 
municipality of Cachipai, Cundinamarca to participate in the MC for the past six years. 
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Yesenia and her husband previously worked in an hacienda that shut down. She said that 
she was left in the field without income or work. They couldn’t find employment until a 
municipality official offered the option to work in the MC, an offer which they accepted.  
Yesenia and her family began small. They decided to bring a small amount of 
squash and plantain because they thought it would be easier to sell those products. They 
went to the bank to get a small loan and began to cultivate the land: 
We started to cultivate the land, planting beans, and then little by little, 
lentils, but small things, not large cultivations but small ones, like passion 
fruit, and blackberries. I saw that the business was growing, because I 
started with 150,000 pesos. Then I was making around 400,000 pesos. I 
said this is not right. I brought everything, whatever I brought I sold. And 
that’s how it went, and I kept working. I started working with chicken. 
The chicken pays. I started working with hens, 20 of them, then 50, and 
now I work with 200. So I realized that eggs where giving. I had another 
income. I had the income from chicken, and the eggs. I brought rabbits . . . 
I brought lunch, dishes made with cassava, with corn. We started to raise 
quail. I started cultivating something and brought small quantities, I 
realized that little by little I was seeing money while I was cultivating. I 
cultivated flowers, I also brought the flowers. (Yesenia, interview, July 30, 
2016). 
From this passage, we find Yesenia’s opportunity to invest in her field and begin 
cultivating (cultivar) whatever she had at her disposal, or what she realized would sell in 
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the market. She diversified the products she sold. She planted fruits and vegetables and 
raised animals to sell at the market, and prepared foods to diversify her source of income. 
As I spent time in her tent clients passed by, and apart from getting fruits and vegetables, 
also asked for eggs and whether she had brought any live chickens for sale. Another 
important aspect of selling at the market, as the previous passage demonstrates was her 
ability to sell cooked meals. People passed by, asking what she had made and seemed 
more than happy to try her food. This was also the case for the food stands that sold the 
lechona, tamales, and the traditional soups.  
Similarly, Rosalia said the market allowed her to increase the amount of food she 
produced and sold. She said, “the best times in the mercados campesino is when we sell 
the masato, the chicha, we sell everything, he empanadas, the arepas and everything . . . 
it has progressed because the community has learned and been taught to prepare the 
quinoa, work with it, and cook it to make other types of foods.” (Rosalia, interview, 
August 20, 2020). 
 With regards to productivity and commercialization of products, producer/sellers 
sought different methods to diversify their subsistence. For example, Yesenia 
demonstrated her ability to diversify her production by cultivating different crops, raising 
animals, and cooking foods to take to the market. Due to lack of times, resources, and 
focus of the research I was not able to visit these farms, and thus the analysis is reserved 
only to my observation of the output of products, the things they sold. Increased 





Producers/sellers at the MC established a strong client base, as well as bonds with 
local community leaders. Sellers and clients referred to each other as neighbors 
(vecina/o) and friends (amiga/o). Some clients spent time with their sellers, sitting with 
them at their tents, engaging in conversation and helping them sell products to other 
clients.  
Lorena, for example, had been working in local MC for around four to five years. 
Before that Lorena and her husband sold fruit in the streets. She worked at the MC with 
the help of her daughter, while her husband worked at another MC location where 
peasants had been hit harder by the District’s funding cuts. The peasants in the location 
her husband worked at did not have tents, or chairs, and they set up their markets in an 
open area. Lorena said her husband and others were exposed to the elements. When asked 
about the obstacles faced while working in the market, Lorena responded: 
“Before there was a partnership and one had something. Here for example we have to pay 
to borrow the tables and the tent. Where my husband is he doesn’t have to pay anything 
but either way he really needs the tent and the tables and everything. The weakness that we 
all have is because of the Mayor because he doesn’t want to sign the partnership with us . 
. . like I tell you it is difficult for my husband who doesn’t have help. Thanks to God we 
have the help and companionship of Mr. Alvaro, but they don’t have anyone to help them.” 
(Lorena, interview, July 30, 2016). 
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Even though her husband had to work under difficult conditions, Lorena said it was better 
to be exposed to the elements than working for someone else. She said that even though 
her husband had to work in the sun and in the rain (al sol y al agua) getting wet and 
sunburnt it was well worth the hard work in the market. 
For Lorena, local community support and the friendships made with clients are 
two of the main factors that have allowed her and her family improve their lives. She 
stated that even though they need support they nonetheless have improved themselves 
because of friendships found. She said: 
“Well one learns to get along and not be ashamed with anyone and 
manage the culture with the people. I mean exchange ideas with one 
another and I think it is good because at least one gets distracted and 
comes to bring natural products, without so much chemicals. I think this is 
good because one doesn’t charge so much to people so that they can 
consume and at the same time one earns little by little” (Lorena, interview, 
July 30, 2016). 
As this passage suggests, selling at the  MC allowed Lorena to gain confidence 
and exchange knowledge with her clients. I observed an interaction between Lorena and a 
costumer, where the costumer was trying to get plantains at a lower price, arguing that 
the plantains where cheaper at a nearby store. Lorena explained to the costumer the 
lengthy process of her trip, how much she had to work to get the produce to the city, and 
that the slight change in the price she asked for was for a fair price. The costumer 
ultimately ended up buying the plantains.  
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Producers and consumers built strong bonds through repeated interactions 
whereby they determined the quality and price of products at the time of the transaction. I 
observed that clients passed by the tents and asked questions about what they sold. 
Sellers provided samples and allowed them to grab the fruit. Bianca, for example, laid out 
the soursops and avocados on her table for clients to see. Clients passed by, asked for the 
price of avocados, or guanabanas. Consumers would sometimes try to bargain the price to 
see if it could be reduced. If they asked about the quality of the product, she would grab a 
knife, and slice a piece off the fruit to show the ripeness of the fruit. 
For example, Oscar stated that increased interaction between him and his clients 
allow him and his wife to easily sell what they produce. Clients already come expecting 
the quality and price of his products. He has an idea of the prices that other stores sell 
produce like potatoes and is thus able to bargain and sell it cheaper. He said he was the 
one that produced the good, so he knew what the cost was to him. This helped him sell 
comparatively cheaper than stores and earn some profit from the sale.  
Instead of making their experience of one of buying, selling and leaving, the 
biweekly was also an opportunity for consumers and producers to integrate and make 
friendships. Working at the market was a transformative experience for Lucia. She said 
that in the field all she had to do was work alone. She said that working in the market 
allowed her to make many friendships, and that she thought of herself as being useful. 
Apart from this, she earned more money for her field and home. Even though she worked 
hard in the field, she had the chance to engage with people by working in the city. She 
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said she had met many good people. They would give her clothes and sheets she needed. 
To this she added that a lot of people in the city valued her.  
The relationship between costumer and client extended beyond the market, 
whereby peasants were not the only ones who traveled to the city; clients also visited 
their producer’s farms to experience the lives of the people they bought from. Lucia 
stated that the friends she made had gone to visit her to see the process in the field. As an 
anecdote, she shared that one lady went to her farm during the days her journey to the 
city started. The lady found Lucia’s work to travel to the city as a heavy one. Bianca 
added that she had become adapted to the work, which provided her with many good 
experiences.  
As the findings suggest, producers and costumers strengthened their reciprocity 
relations. Peasants and other sellers made use of non-market and cooperative mechanisms 
with local community leaders, and built friendships with clients to access a small but 
consistent market and thus increase their sales. Through continued interaction, peasants 
communicated with discourses of fair prices for both producers and consumers, and 
localized production to buyers who tried to buy at cheaper prices.  
Peasants and other sellers also increased their chances of selling their products by 
challenging how food quality and price is commonly conceived in market transactions. In 
the market, sensorial dimensions of the products sold took the place of standardized 
quality measures. Buyers interacted with the sellers and the product, found out from 
where sellers and the food came. Consumers were able to touch and see the ripeness of 
the fruits as peasants opened them, to eat and taste the tangerines, or oranges that sellers 
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gave to their clients before they made their decision to buy. In this way, the market re-
embedded producers and sellers, peasants and city dwellers, removing the alienation from 
nature common in industrial processes of production, which hide the environmental and 
labor costs, the value of people and nature that allow corporate and industrial agriculture 
to create profits and transform economic markets. 
Another point of analysis with regards to improved commercialization is that 
peasants maintained cultural food practices. The peasants in the MC continued selling 
traditional foods such as lechona, tamales, and ajiaco soups that they prepared from 
scratch in the mornings. Clients would ask sellers if they had brought live chickens to 
later cook their own traditional chicken soups. These were not foods that the District 
would consider sanitary or safe. Nonetheless, sellers and consumers of these did not seem 
to perceive these foods as something unsafe or unsanitary to eat. Rather, I venture to add, 
it was something essential to their identities, an experience of Colombians throughout 
their history.  
An important aspect of peasants’ efforts to revive and maintain traditional food 
sales is the relations of reciprocity that emerged between urban citizens and those 
peasants who came to their locality. The bond between the client and producer, apart 
from one based on a purely monetary transaction is also an affective bond based on the 
exchange of knowledge and friendship. Clients spent time with sellers, protected them, 
and provided gifts. Furthermore, clients made the effort to visit peasants in their farms, to 
learn about their experiences and to see firsthand the hard work it takes for them to make 
it to the city. Through these bonds, producers and consumers were able to know and 
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recognize each other, and hence give value to an otherwise meaningless interaction based 
solely on the end commodity and the price the costumer was willing to pay. Consumers, 
by intimately interacting with producers, came to understand the value of the foods they 
bought, and were thus more willing to pay fair prices throughout the neighborhood. 
These actions point to non-market and cooperative mechanisms with local 
community leaders. Through continued interaction, peasants communicated with 
discourses of fair prices for both producers and consumers, and localized production to 
buyers who tried to buy at cheaper prices. In this case, peasants and consumers went 
beyond market relations, beyond the price of the product. Apart from the value added of 
the product, peasants and consumers built lasting relationships. 
As the passages above indicate, the local MC emphasizes what I conceive of as a 
process of rural-urban integration. This rural-urban integration is based on a sustainable 
development of both marginalized and often excluded peasants, and lower income urban 
neighborhoods. The market, through this integration, sought to improve peasant incomes 
through fair trade, to maintain Colombian cultural food practices, ensure collective 
participation of peasant farmers, and at the same time attend to the need of feeding 
citizens in lower income areas of Bogota. Alongside the direct political intervention that 
peasant organizations pushed for at the District level, peasants in the localities expressed 
and challenged mainstream conceptions of food distribution and commercialization 
through their quotidian practices in the market. 
LIMIT TO AUTONOMY – TRANSPORTATION 
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Of the struggles that farmers have experienced the most common were issues of 
transportation. The District’s funding cuts left a void where many of the farmers had to 
figure how to reach the city on their own. Peasants needed to find vehicles to contract and 
search for others to travel with to the city. Transport trucks only travel to the city if they 
have enough supplies to make the trip worth it, which complicated peasant’s search for 
transportation. If peasants were to contract a car service on their own, many wouldn’t be 
able to cover the cost of transportation. 
For example, Lucia stated that transportation was difficult for her because 
transport charged too much. Another issue for her was that where she came from the cars 
would get stuck in unpaved muddy roads when it rained. To resolve the issue, she 
contracted a truck that brought her food and the food produced by other families to the 
local MC she worked, as well as other local markets. The trucks would arrive in the 
afternoon, make the rounds to other farms, and at around five in the morning the next day 
they would unload the cargo. Before they were able to able to contract the car driver,  
Lucia and her family had to first reach another town to find truck that would get her to 
the city.  
Transportation from Tolima was the most expensive, costing Lorena $450,000 
pesos (around $150 dollars) every time she traveled to the market. Similar to Bianca, 
their source of transportation was always uncertain. If it rained trucks could get stuck on 
the road and if a driver got sick she had to look for another person. To be able to afford 
the cost of travel she had to split the cost with 20 neighboring peasant families. To gather 
enough supplies for the driver to make it affordable to travel she also collected produce 
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from peasant families that she would sell along with what she brought to the market for a 
commission.  
For Oscar, transportation was also the most difficult aspect of working at the MC. 
Since he and his family came from the Department of Cundinamarca, transportation was 
more affordable, at 100 thousand pesos (around $32 dollars) round trip, but still it was the 
biggest part of their cost of production. It was cheaper whenever a car traveled to 
different parks with additional produce from other farmers. Whenever he had to pay on 
his own, transportation was more expensive, so he tried to split transportation costs with 
other farmers from the area he was from.  
This was the case for other sellers. Some previously had support from the 
municipalities they came from, which used to provide them with buses. However, since 
the partnerships ended they had to figure out how to find transportation on their own. 
Oftentimes, they had to make multiple stops to find transportation that will take them to 
the city.  
Difficulties with transportation was the first effect of peasant’s loss of 
institutional support. At times, some didn’t see it worth it to return to the city. What made 
the return possible for some was that they wanted to see their clients. To find enough 
money for transportation some had to sometimes charge at higher price for what they 
sold.  
The cost of transportation presented a clear impediment to seller’s autonomy. As 
Guarin (2013) argues, the minimal amount of food peasants produce has to be properly 
aggregated to be able to be transported in large quantities to the city. The chains of 
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intermediaries and transporters were created as a mechanism whereby scattered peasant 
producers can supply variable amounts of products can assemble their production for 
distribution. The inability to rely on consistent transportation thus poses for peasants 
participating in MC challenges that threaten their ability to build their own networks, and 
move away from mainstream transportation channels to sell their products.  
 LIMIT TO AUTONOMY – LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
 
The transportation issue was for sellers at the MC the result of the District’s cut of 
funds for the program. Lorena for example, blamed the Mayor of Bogota for making it 
difficult for her and her husband to come work at the market. She said: 
Before there was a partnership and one had some security. Here for example 
we have to pay to borrow tables and the tent. But where my husband is he 
doesn’t pay but he nonetheless needs the tent and the tables and everything. 
The weakness that we have is the fault of the Mayor because he doesn’t 
want to sign the partnership (Lorena, interview, July 30, 2016).  
Bianca similarly praised the benefits of the market to not only benefit the city but 
also peasants. She argued that by attempting to remove the farmer from the city, the 
District removes the value and importance of peasants. She said that peasants have been 
leaving their farms, including their younger members. She asked, “what do we do killing 
ourselves with hard work if they don’t value us?” Furthermore, she said that the market 
did value the peasant:  
 88 
This gives them value, and it raises the people spirits to go and cultivate, 
harvest, because we are going there to Bogota to the peasant plazas. It was 
good that they supported it, I thought it was excellent, but unfortunately the 
Mayor doesn’t want to know anything about the peasant. The peasant there 
(in the farm), he doesn’t care. But this does give peasants value.” (Bianca, 
Interview, August 20, 2016). 
 
FROM MERCADOS CAMPESINOS TO MERCADOS GOURMET 
 
 The markets did continue. However, the way that they would be managed contrast 
with the notions of peasant production, and urban-rural integration noted above. The 
District, through the Secretariat of Economic Development, The Institute for social 
Economy (Instituto Para la Economia Social, IPES), and other regional institutions 
eventually bypassed peasant organizations, and hence the way that these managed the 
markets. 
In early 2016, peasant organizations once again began a process of political 
pressure against plans to end Mercados Campesinos. On April 5, Mayor Enrique Peñalosa 
was surprised by a group of peasant men and women selling fruits, vegetables, and 
traditional Colombian dishes in a makeshift market inside the installations of the district 
council. At the time the Mayor gave the peasants gathered his word: the farmers’ markets 
were going to continue(“La palabra de Peñalosa con los organizadores de los Mercados 
Campesinos”, 2016) However, moments before, Peñalosa had presented the proposal for 
his tenure’s economic development plan, “Bogota Better For Everyone” [“Bogota Mejor 
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Para Todos”]. One of the proposal’s articles intended to derogate the council’s 455 accord 
of 2010. 
Soon after peasant organizations found out that Peñalosa was trying to eliminate 
peasant markets, CICC and ALCAMPO united to mobilize peasants and take part in a 
peaceful sit in outside of the Economic Development Secretariat building. They also 
lobbied council members to leave accord 455 in the development plan. Peñalosa’s plans to 
derogate the legislation failed, and the peasant organizations managed to amend the 
development plan to include language regarding the sustainable rural development of 
peasant economies. Although the article of the development plan was not explicit in stating 
the protection of MC, the ambiguous language of the article amendment, however, has 
allowed the District to strengthen peasant economies as they saw fit.  
Peñalosa, after failing to derogate the council decree protecting peasant economies, 
called for a peasant market to take place in June 24th, to celebrate the National Peasant 
Day that had taken place since 2010.  But instead of mercados campesinos, they would be 
called mercados gourmet. The Special Administrative and Planning Region [Región 
Administrativa y de Planificación Especial, RAPE] a regional planning committee 
combining the central Departments of Colombia, and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the UN (FAO), announced a bidding process for 250 peasants to participate 
in the market. The conditions for those who wanted to participate included a series of 
sanitary requirements, such as having canned traditional dishes such as sancocho, lechona 
and tamal. Leaders from peasant organizations leading MC accused the development 
secretary of placing too much of a burden for peasants, who wouldn’t be able to afford the 
documentation or means to afford canning their products. Furthermore, the peasants would 
not be able to offer fresh, and traditional products for their customers. 
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The district’s proposal to establish the market celebrating national peasant day on 
June 24th was postponed. A couple of weeks after the initial proposal of Mercados 
Gourmet the FAO announced that “considering the impartiality derived from its nature as 
a Specialized System of the United Nations, they [The FAO] see themselves compromised 
to execute this activity, and have thus opted to not continue with the actions related to the 
organization and implementation of the agri-food fair” (FAO, 2016) The Economic 
Development Secretary, Freddy Castro, announced that the market would take place in 
October, and that the city was continuing conversations with the stakeholders associated in 
the process to make it happen (“‘Haremos El Mercado Campesino En Octubre’: Secretaría 
de Desarrollo Económico” 2016).  
 
A PEASANT MARKET WITHOUT PEASANTS 
  
An MC took place in Bolivar Plaza once again in October 14th (two days prior to 
the World Food Day). News outlets reported that 325 participants (as opposed to 1500 to 
2000 who participated in prior years) put on display their products, which included fruits, 
vegetables, as well as processed goods like honey, coffee and typical dishes. While less 
participants sold at the market, the District stated that the event was better organized. 
Furthermore, 50 of the participants were part of business talks with restaurant, plazas and 
hotel owners. As Freddy Castro, director of the Development Secretariat of the city of 
Bogota mentioned, “We want to work to help them open channels with clients” hoping that 
each successful deal represented incomes between two and 10 million pesos (“Campesinos, 
de vuelta en la Plaza de Bolívar,” 2016). The District also announced that biweekly markets 
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would continue and guaranteed that 420 local markets would take place in the next three 
years (“Mercados Campesinos Llegarán a Toda Bogotá”, 2016).  
Afterwards, peasant organizations made an announcement that the District 
completely excluded them from taking part in the management of the MC, thereby 
excluding larger participation of peasants who had collectively worked the past twelve 
years to make sure they had sufficient supplies, find their own transportation to travel to 
the city, organize their own events, and sell directly to consumers. The District bypassed 
peasant organizations, instead working with regional state municipalities and the RAPE to 
choose the participants and manage the event.  As Castro stated, “it was the Agriculture 
secretaries who chose the participants. They (peasant organizations) have all the right to 
protest, but that is how we planned this event” (“Mercados campesinos llegarán a toda 
Bogotá,” 2016).  
The announcement that peasant organizations made also included statements and 
photographic evidence of what they said were inconsistencies of the market managed by 
the District and regional institutions. These included the sales of products made by large 
producers and landholders, industrial canned and processed products, empty stalls 
(meaning that less than the stated number of people participated), and sale of imported 
products. In all, the announcement called the event a failure to recognize local economies, 
and the failure to recognize collective organization of the MC.  
The case of mercados campesinos shows how peasant organizations have become 
increasingly dependent of district authorities, the point where continuation of MC hinged 
on the District to provide funds and to reconfigure the program through the governments’’ 
conception of how it should be managed, and who should participate. During the first years, 
the program was managed and funded in part through donations of international institutions 
and NGOs. Although peasant organizations managed to place language in district decrees 
 92 
recognizing peasant economies, and the district’s obligation to financially and 
administratively support the MCs, it also allowed the District to gain direct control over 
monetary and logistical aspects of the project. 
Many peasant organization leaders, and peasants participating in Mercados 
Campesinos saw these rules as representative of a food system that threatened their own 
views of life, health, and livelihoods. They argued that the regulations favor larger scale 
agriculture and undermine the livelihoods and recognition of small-scale farmers. In 
contrast, those in favor of the regulations, like the Mayor and the city’s development 
institution argued that the sale of produce and homemade dishes, without required food 
standard certification would expose consumers to health threats. 
With the new Mayor’s administration, and the changes in staff of government 
agencies, the District has bypassed peasant organizations, and enacted policies prohibiting 
the sale of fresh traditional dishes and certain produce, and requiring sanitary labels and 
standards of food packaging, imposing high cost of participation for small-scale producers. 
The District’s decision to limit the number of peasants through contracts with institutional 
channels contrasts with the process of associative organization that the peasant 
organizations had established through the CCMs. Furthermore, the sanitary requirements, 
and the District’s attempt to establish a “gourmet market” imply a shift from concerns from 
peasant rights and recognition, to that of standardized, sanitary production, and bourgeois 
demands of good food, instead of food availability and affordability for poorer city 





As was noted in the introduction, peasants participating in the local Mercados 
Campesinos cannot merely be described as showing characteristics of peasants basing 
their decision on moral reciprocity and subsistence ethics alone. The practice of peasants 
in the MC represents an interface between the peasant moral economies of Scott and 
entrepreneurial farming described in classic economics. In traveling to the city to sell 
their products, peasants stretched the limit of their peasantness, seeking ways to increase 
productivity and sales of their products for better incomes. However, in this case peasants 
were seeking to continue returning to the countryside to farm. It can also be argued that, 
the logic that governed the organization and development of the MC peasants’ activities 
was distant from the mainstream markets, and therefore an attempt to gain autonomy 
from the main distribution and commercialization chains.  
Peasants sought to maintain autonomy producing and selling their products 
outside of the traditional transportation, distribution and super market chains of Bogota. 
As the interviews show, the main impediments to autonomy were transportation and lack 
of institutional support. Peasants and urban farmers were aware of the unequal terms and 
prices that intermediaries offered. Those that did sell to intermediaries point to the 
challenge of having to sell surplus produce versus the limited amount they could sell in 
the farmer’s market. The District has criticized MCs for being an inadequate venue to 
assure food security to Bogota’s citizens. However, the peasants made a different 
argument. They had enough supply of food and only if more MC markets were available 
they would be able to sell even more of their produce at a fair price, instead of having to 
have their food either go to waste or sell it at too low prices for intermediaries. 
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The interviews and observations of the market also show the limits of the local 
MC. The peasants’ struggle for transportation was a constant problem. It is difficult for 
peasants to efficiently collect, aggregate, and transport significant amounts of food to the 
city, apart from setting up the commercialization venue. Only through collective pooling 
of funds and food supplies were they able to contract transport. The irregular guarantee of 
transportation meant that peasants could lose the harvested food and not be able to sell 
raised animals because they were sometimes not able to travel to the city.  
The relationship between peasants and local citizens was also not perfect. The 
ability that peasants had to negotiate prices with their clients was not always beneficial; 
peasants could sell at fair prices, but sometimes would also end up selling at lower prices. 
Clients could make an argument of lower prices in other tents, or at a local store, to 
reduce the prices that peasants were able to sell at. The end of the market posed a 
dilemma for sellers. After the trueque took place there was still produce and food left 
unsold. Peasants were thus forced to lower their prices as much as they could to sell what 
was left, to the benefit of costumers who went late to the market. The irregularity of 
prices is thus something that peasants and communal board leaders like Alvaro could not 
fully address.  
The point here is to demonstrate that although the MCs offered benefits and 
improvements to peasants, the democratic aspects espoused by the peasant organizations 
previously in charge of managing the program were very limited. The MC program, 
although hailed as a cooperative and democratic process, was not completely organized 
by peasants themselves. As noted in the struggles the peasants faced, what mostly limited 
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their ability to directly sell to consumers was the District’s decisions to end their 
partnerships with peasant organizations and international NGOs. Furthermore, the MC 
program was conceived within a District policy under the jurisdiction of District agencies 
to decide how the program would be managed.  
These observations explored the main contention of the thesis: peasants were 
partially autonomous. Their goals and objectives were still constructed and decided by a 
broad of actors with various degrees of power and influence to configure and shape MCs. 
Furthermore, the presence of the government, and the institutional leverage they had over 














Chapter Five: Conclusion and Research Implications 
 
MERCADOS CAMPESINOS IN THE CURRENT CUNJUNCTURE 
 
Although the District and the RAPE regional agency took control over the 
management of the mercados campesinos  program, this was nonetheless part of a rising 
peasant movement throughout Colombia aiming to gain recognition of the peasantries 
and solve longstanding agrarian issues of misrecognition in the country. A larger series of 
peasant mobilizations has challenged the state’s economic opening to international 
markets, and modernization of agricultural systems nationwide. State policies favoring 
capital expansion has become part of the productive and commercial aspects of the 
Colombian economy, threatening peasant livelihoods, control over the means of 
production and resources. The long history over failed land reforms in the 1960’s has 
become a key aspect of peasant mobilization. Most recently, general agrarian strikes have 
effectively challenged the state apparatus, contesting the state’s neoliberal policies, and 
effectively placed the smallholder agrarian sector in the negotiating table, demanding 
long sought reforms and reparations. The fight is over recognition, access to land, and the 
ability of peasants to be recognized as the appropriate source of the country’s food 
supply, ideas wrapped around the broader concepts of food sovereignty and peasant 
autonomy.  
The District’s sanitary and food quality requirements to participate in the 
Mercados Campesinos managed without the input of peasant organizations reduced the 
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numbers of beneficiaries of the program, limiting it to farmers who could afford canning 
their products and obtaining the proper licenses to sell. Peasants trying to participate in 
the program, instead of relying on the organizational capacity of peasants through the 
CCMs now have to go through a contract process with either the Secretariat of Economic 
Development Agency, or the RAPE regional agency.  
To apply, peasants are required to register formularies specifying what types of 
products they sell, whether they produce fruits, vegetables, or processed products, and 
whether they have required sanitary licenses. The program does not provide subsidies for 
transportation, and peasants have to comply with market operation hours (Inscripciones 
Mercados Campesinos 2017). The District, in attempting to create a “gourmet market’ 
gave the MC program a different meaning. Instead of providing a space whereby 
peasants, through associations (and the aid of nonprofits) organized their own supply, 
transportation, and commercialization, and commercialization channels, limited the 
participation of peasants. They now have to apply as part of a contract, based on the 
requirements above, to be able to sell in the District’s Mercados Campesinos. 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
The fact is that the current Mercado Campesinos is that the District, through the 
Secretariat of Economic Development, and other agencies like Bogota’s Institute for 
Social Economy, is allowing some peasants to sell in farmers’ markets. Readers could 
argue that the market is the ultimate expression of what McMichael calls ‘food from 
somewhere’. The District still promotes the market as a space where peasants can sell 
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fresh products directly to consumers. The District also promotes this food as coming from 
these peasants, who produced the food they are selling with their own hands. The 
transformation from food from nowhere to food from somewhere is apparent, given that 
the peasants who were contracted to sell food met the criteria of ‘peasant’. Nonetheless, 
what is of importance to note, is that the same notion of food from somewhere that 
McMichael states that peasant movements promote can be stripped of its identity 
associative meanings, removing any notion of peasant rights and autonomy.  
The District’s plan on how the MC program is to be managed, and who gets to 
participate in it, put into question the viability of food sovereignty movements seeking to 
gain autonomy, as well as demanding institutional rights and recognition. Apart form the 
institutional constraints, transportation and geographical constraints also threatened the 
viability of the market, as the previous chapter demonstrated. How can Colombian 
peasants establish alternative food networks when they are not able to influence the 
management or makeup of the participants in the market? How can peasants achieve 
autonomy when seeking transportation to and from the campo, to buy and sell their 
products, becomes risky and unaffordable?  
 
The proposal that peasant organizations put forth through Mercados Campesinos 
is of specific importance in the context of post-conflict that the country faces. The 
unequal relationship between rural areas and urban centers, land concentration, and mass 
agricultural production could further threaten peasant livelihoods in the country. 
Colombian peasants could be forced into making the difficult decision to leave their land 
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and head to urban centers, to the poverty belts of the country, as Efrain and other peasant 
leaders called the informal settlements surrounding Colombia’s cities.  
Another option is for peasants to become rural wage laborers, or substitute their 
production for the production of illicit plants like coca, which would continue the drug 
trade in Colombia. According to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) of the United States, registered 188.000 hectares of coca production in the year 
2016, an increase in 18 percent from 2015, and surpassing the 2001 record of 169,000 
hectares of coca. As Carlos Julio of ADUC stated, the peasant organizations are not 
against quality food standards and other requirements of the District. They instead seek 
institutional support for peasants to be able to meet such standards, rather than benefitting 
the few peasants can do so on their own (Carlos Julio, interview, August 2, 2016). 
The thesis, while providing some insight into the different meanings and practices 
that peasant organizations, and peasant families strived for when attempting to change 
food policies, also questioned the prospects of the Mercados Campesinos experience 
once the District bypassed them to manage the program. Nonetheless, Schiavoni’s 
relational framework helps see peasant food sovereignty movements like that of 
Colombia’s peasants as an open ended and historical processes.  
Peasant organizations, such as ADUC and FENSUAGRO united once more to 
reconsider together to respond to the District’s notion of the farmers’ market. Those 
studying conceptions of food sovereignty can take heed to what can happen after food 
sovereignty is institutionally achieved. As the relational approach suggests, institutional 
recognition is only the first step of the analysis. After recognition, different actors 
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continually contest and challenge what it means to be a peasant with the right to continue 























Alcaldia Mayor de Bogotá. Decreto 315 de 2006 (2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=21063 
Alvarez, J., Rudas, G., & Elcy, C. (1991). Tres estudios sobre la comercialización de 
alimentos en Colombia (1. ed). Bogotá, D.E., Colombia: Pontificia Universidad 
Javeriana, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas : ECOE Ediciones. 
Araghi, F. A. (1995). Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990. The Sociological Quarterly, 
36(2), 337–368. 
Bernstein, H. (2014). Food sovereignty via the “peasant way”: a sceptical view. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(6), 1031–1063. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.852082 
Beuf, A. (2016). Las centralidades urbanas como espacios concebidos: referentes 
técnicos e ideológicos de los modelos territoriales del Plan de Ordenamiento 
Territorial (POT) de Bogotá (Colombia). Cuadernos de Geografía (Bogotá), 
25(2), 199–219. https://doi.org/10.15446/rcdg.v25n2.54776 
Blasi, E., Cicatiello, C., Pancino, B., & Franco, S. (2015). Alternative food chains as a 
way to embed mountain agriculture in the urban market: the case of Trentino. 
Agricultural and Food Economics, 3, 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40100-014-
0023-0 
Brand, P. (Ed.). (2009). La ciudad latinoamericana en el siglo XXI. Globalizacion, 
neoliberalismo, planeacion (1st. edition). Medellín, Colombia: Universidad 
 102 
Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellin, Facultad de Arquitectura, Escuela de 
Planeacion Urbano-Regional. 
Burnett, K., & Murphy, S. (2014). What place for international trade in food sovereignty? 
The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(6), 1065–1084. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.876995 
Caicedo, J. (2016, April 5). ¿Qué pasa con los mercados campesinos en Bogotá? 
Retrieved December 12, 2016, from http://www.las2orillas.co/pasa-los-mercados-
campesinos-bogota/ 
Campesinos, de vuelta en la Plaza de Bolívar. (2016, October 13). Retrieved December 
12, 2016, from http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/campesinos-de-
vuelta-plaza-articulo-660254 
Carvajal Sanchez, N. I. (2011). La dinámica del ordenamiento territorial en Colombia: 
Contraste de dinámicas urbano-rurales en la región metropolitana de Bogotá 
(Ph.D.). Universite de Montreal (Canada), Canada. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/docview/879054926/abstract/82
6866BC589B4821PQ/1 
Castro, B. (1994). Aspectos de la vida diaria en las ciudades republicanas. Retrieved from 
http://www.banrepcultural.org/node/32596 
Chayanov, A. V. (1986). The Theory of Peasant Economy (1 edition). Madison, Wis: 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
 103 
Clark, P. (2016). Can the State Foster Food Sovereignty? Insights from the Case of 
Ecuador. Journal of Agrarian Change, 16(2), 183–205. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12094 
Cockburn, J. (2014). Bolivia’s Food Sovereignty & Agrobiodiversity: Undermining the 
Local to Strengthen the State? Theory in Action, 7(4), 67–89. 
Colombia: detienen a líder de protesta campesina acusado de nexo con FARC. (2013, 
August 26). Agence France Presse. Retrieved from 
http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=AFPES00020130826e98q0
05es&cat=a&ep=ASE 
Cronon, W. (1992). Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (Reprint edition). 
New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Cruz Roa, M. (2016). Futuro de los mercados campesinos en Bogotá está en vilo - 
Bogotá. Retrieved December 9, 2016, from 
http://www.eltiempo.com/bogota/mercados-campesinos-en-bogota/16547573 
DECLARATION OF NYÉLÉNI. (2007, February 27). Retrieved from 
https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290 
Desmarais, A. A. (2007). La Via Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants. 
Halifax : London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Edelman, M. (2005). Bringing the Moral Economy Back in... to the Study of 21st-
Century Transnational Peasant Movements. American Anthropologist, 107(3), 
331–345. 
 104 
El Tiempo. (2004a, November 2). Mercado Campesino de Tomara la Plaza de Bolivar. 
Retrieved December 11, 2016, from 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1506736 
El Tiempo. (2004b, November 5). De Mercado Por la Plaza de Bolivar. Retrieved 
December 11, 2016, from http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-
1512871 
Foucault, M. (2010). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--
1979 (Reprint edition). New York: Picador. 
Friedma, H., & McMichael, P. (1989). AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE SYSTEM: 
The rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present. Sociologia 
Ruralis, 29(2), 93–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.1989.tb00360.x 
Giménez, E. H., & Shattuck, A. (2011). Food crises, food regimes and food movements: 
rumblings of reform or tides of transformation? The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
38(1), 109–144. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2010.538578 
Gouveia, L., & Juska, A. (2002). Taming Nature, Taming Workers: Constructing the 
Separation Between Meat Consumption and Meat Production in the U.S. 
Sociologia Ruralis, 42(4), 370–390. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00222 
Guarin, A. (2009). Old links in a new chain:  The unlikely resilience of corner stores in 
Bogotá, Colombia (Ph.D.). University of California, Berkeley, United States -- 




Guarín, A. (2013). The Value of Domestic Supply Chains: Producers, Wholesalers, and 
Urban Consumers in Colombia. Development Policy Review, 31(5), 511–530. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12023 
Heller, C. (2011). Another (Food) World Is Possible: Post-industrial French Paysans 
Fight for a Solidaire Global Food Policy. Anthropological Journal of European 
Cultures; New York, 20(1), 89–110. 
ILSA. (2012). Mercados Campesinos: Experiencia Socioeconómica, Política y Cultural 
en la Ciudad Región (Publication). Bogotá: Secretaria Distrital de Desarrollo 
Económico, The Oxford Committee For Famine Relief (Oxfam), Instituto 
Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Derecho Alternativos (ILSA), Comité de 
Interlocución Campesino y Comunal. 
Instituto Latinoamericano para una Sociedad y un Desarrollo Alternativos (ILSA). 
(2010). Producto No. 4: Un documento con la Estrategia de Organizacion donde 
se muestre el enfoque actual, las proyecciones y los avances obtenidos en los 
procesos anteriores. 
Jarosz, L. (2014). Considering sovereignty, care ethics and policy in food politics. 
Dialogues in Human Geography, 4(2), 229–232. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820614537162 
La palabra de Peñalosa con los organizadores de los Mercados Campesinos. (2016, May 
5). Retrieved December 12, 2016, from http://www.las2orillas.co/la-palabra-de-
penalosa-con-los-organizadores-de-los-mercados-campesinos/ 
 106 
LeGrand, C. (1986). Frontier expansion and peasant protest in Colombia, 1850-1936 
(1st ed). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
McKay, B., Nehring, R., & Walsh-Dilley, M. (2014). The “state” of food sovereignty in 
Latin America: political projects and alternative pathways in Venezuela, Ecuador 
and Bolivia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(6), 1175–1200. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.964217 
McMichael, P. (2009). A food regime genealogy. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(1), 
139–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150902820354 
McMichael, P. (2015). A comment on Henry Bernstein’s way with peasants, and food 
sovereignty. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(1), 193–204. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.936853 
Mejia, G. R. (2000). Los años del cambio: historia urbana de Bogotá, 1820-1910. 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. 
Mercados campesinos llegarán a toda Bogotá. (2016, October 14). Retrieved December 
12, 2016, from http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/mercados-
campesinos-llegaran-toda-bogota-articulo-660453 
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society, 19(1), 1–
31. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085149000000001 
Moore, J. W. (2003). “The Modern World-System” as Environmental History? Ecology 
and the Rise of Capitalism. Theory and Society, 32(3), 307–377. 
Ojeda, R. (2008). The Supply of Santafé Before the Independence: Llorente’s Store. 
Tabula Rasa, (No.8), 147–175. 
 107 
Oxfam. (2015). Mercados Campesinos: Iniciativa de Desarrollo Rural Incluyente 
Liderada Por Organizaciones Campesinas. Oxfam. 
Parrado, A., & Gutiérrez,  omar. (2014). Cuadernos de Mercados Campesinos n°2: la 
comercialización de alimentos en los mercados campesinos: aprendizajes y 
desafíos. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Parrado, A., & Molina, J. P. (2014). Mercados Campesinos: Modelo de Acceso a 
Mercados y Seguridad Alimentaria en La Region Central de Colombia (1st ed.). 
Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. 
Patel, R. (2009). Food sovereignty. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(3), 663–706. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150903143079 
Pesquera, A. (2011, April). Liderar con el ejemplo:  Cómo las ciudades lograron conectar 
los productores y productoras rurales a los mercados urbanos de alimentos en 
Colombia. Oxfam. 
Ploeg, J. D. van der. (2009). The New Peasantries: Struggles for Autonomy and 
Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization (1 edition). London: 
Routledge. 
Posada, A. R. (2016). Guerreros y campesinos. Ariel Colombia. 
Ramírez Pascagaza, J. D. (2013). La implementación de la política de abastecimiento 
alimentario de Bogotá en el sector mayorista de la comercialización de 
alimentos: restricciones y dificultades (Primera edición). Bogotá: Universidad de 
los Andes, Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre Desarrollo. 
 108 
Renting, H., Marsden, T. K., & Banks, J. (2003). Understanding Alternative Food 
Networks: Exploring the Role of Short Food Supply Chains in Rural 
Development. Environment and Planning A, 35(3), 393–411. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/a3510 
Rose, N. (1996). Governing “advanced” liberal democracies. In B. T. Osborne & N. Rose 
(Eds.) (pp. 37–64). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Schiavoni, C. M. (2015). Competing Sovereignties, Contested Processes: Insights from 
the Venezuelan Food Sovereignty Experiment. Globalizations, 12(4), 466–480. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2015.1005967 
Schiavoni, C. M. (2016). The contested terrain of food sovereignty construction: toward a 
historical, relational and interactive approach. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 
0(0), 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1234455 
Scott, J. C. (1977). The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in 
Southeast Asia (8.11.1977 edition). New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Semana. (2009a, March 3). ¿Cuál es la historia de Fensuagro? Retrieved June 13, 2017, 
from http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cual-historia-fensuagro/100690-3 
Semana. (2009b, March 6). Fensuagro rechaza acusaciones por caso de secretario 




Shattuck, A., Schiavoni, C. M., & VanGelder, Z. (2015). Translating the Politics of Food 
Sovereignty: Digging into Contradictions, Uncovering New Dimensions. 
Globalizations, 12(4), 421–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2015.1041243 
Silva, A. (1976). Evaluation of food market reform: Corabastos-Bogotá. n.p. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Governance-beyond-the-State. Urban Studies, 42(11), 1991–2006. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00420980500279869 
Thompson, E. P. (1993). Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture. 
New York: The New Press. 
Tovar Pinzón, H. (1975). El movimiento campesino en Colombia durante los siglos XIXy 
XX (1. ed). Bogotá: Ediciones Libres. 
Van Der Ploeg, J. D. (2010). The Food Crisis, Industrialized Farming and the Imperial 
Regime. Journal of Agrarian Change, 10(1), 98–106. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2009.00251.x 
Via Campesina. (n.d.). Organisation: The International Peasant’s Voice. Retrieved 
December 1, 2016, from https://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-
mainmenu-44 
Yepes A., D., Suárez M., J. A., & Proyecto Política Pública de Seguridad Alimentaria 
(Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos) (Eds.). (2005). 
Consumo de alimentos en Bogotá: déficit y canasta básicarecomendada. Bogotá: 
Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos. 
 110 
Yin, R. K. (2014). Case study research: design and methods (Fifth edition). Los Angeles: 
SAGE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
